Designing Low Cost Error Correction Schemes for Improving Memory Reliability by Chen, Hsing-Min (Author) et al.
Designing Low Cost Error Correction Schemes for Improving Memory Reliability
by
Hsing-Min Chen
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved April 2017 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Chaitali Chakrabarti, Chair
Trevor Mudge
Carole-Jean Wu
Umit Ogras
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2017
©2017 Hsing-Min Chen
All Rights Reserved
ABSTRACT
Memory systems are becoming increasingly error-prone, and thus guaranteeing
their reliability is a major challenge. In this dissertation, new techniques to improve
the reliability of both 2D and 3D dynamic random access memory (DRAM) systems
are presented. The proposed schemes have higher reliability than current systems but
with lower power, better performance and lower hardware cost.
First, a low overhead solution that improves the reliability of commodity DRAM
systems with no change in the existing memory architecture is presented. Specifically,
five erasure and error correction (E-ECC) schemes are proposed that provide at least
Chipkill-Correct protection for x4 (Schemes 1, 2 and 3), x8 (Scheme 4) and x16
(Scheme 5) DRAM systems. All schemes have superior error correction performance
due to the use of strong symbol-based codes. In addition, the use of erasure codes
extends the lifetime of the 2D DRAM systems.
Next, two error correction schemes are presented for 3D DRAM memory systems.
The first scheme is a rate-adaptive, two-tiered error correction scheme (RATT-ECC)
that provides strong reliability (1010x reduction in raw FIT rate) for an HBM-like 3D
DRAM system that services CPU applications. The rate-adaptive feature of RATT-
ECC enables permanent bank failures to be handled through sparing. It can also be
used to significantly reduce the refresh power consumption without decreasing the
reliability and timing performance.
The second scheme is a two-tiered error correction scheme (Config-ECC) that sup-
ports different sized accesses in GPU applications with strong reliability. It addresses
the mismatch between data access size and fixed sized ECC scheme by designing a
product code based flexible scheme. Config-ECC is built around a core unit designed
for 32B access with a simple extension to support 64B and 128B accesses. Compared
to fixed 32B and 64B ECC schemes, Config-ECC reduces the failure in time (FIT)
i
rate by 200x and 20x, respectively. It also reduces the memory energy by 17% (in the
dynamic mode) and 21% (in the static mode) compared to a state-of-the-art fixed
64B ECC scheme.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
In large scale computing systems, guaranteeing the reliability of its memory system
is a major challenge. More than 40% of hardware related failures are attributed to
errors in memory systems [1]. These errors cause computing systems to malfunction
and also lead to serious security vulnerabilities [2]. To make it worse, due to the
scaling down and the high density of memory cells, the number of errors is projected
to increase in the future.
In this dissertation, we propose schemes to improve the reliability of both 2D
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) and 3D DRAM systems. 2D DRAM system
is used as main memory in most computer systems. Unfortunately, these systems are
vulnerable to different kinds of faults (e.g. hard, intermittent or random) [3,4]. These
faults manifest as single bit errors, multiple errors along a row and/or along a column
of a chip and even whole chip failure. Error correction coding (ECC) [5] schemes are
typically used to deal with DRAM errors. Designing an ECC code with low storage
overhead and good error correction performance is quite a challenge.
2D DRAM has the advantages of high density, high capacity and low cost but its
performance is limited by memory latency and bandwidth. 3D die-stacked DRAM
is a promising solution to improve the system performance [6] and reduce the power
consumption. It can provide higher bandwidth, lower power consumption, lower la-
tency and has smaller footprint compared to 2D DRAM. There are several prototypes
for 3D DRAM, including high bandwidth memory (HBM) [7], hybrid memory cube
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(HMC) [8] and Octopus from Tezzaron [9]. However, 3D DRAM suffers from seri-
ous reliability issues due to higher density and thermal issues. Furthermore, since a
single data line is not striped across multiple chips like 2D DRAM, it increases the
difficulty of designing a strong ECC scheme. Also, through-silicon-via (TSV) failures
occur only in the 3D DRAM structure and add to the complexity. In the rest of
this chapter, we briefly describe the proposed low cost, low overhead and strong ECC
schemes for 2D and 3D DRAM memory systems that improve their reliability without
degrading their performance.
1.2 2D DRAM Reliability
Most computer systems use dynamic random access memory (DRAM) as main
memory. As the size of DRAM in computer systems increases, DRAM reliability
becomes a serious concern. The traditional single bit error correction and double bit
error detection (SEC-DED) code is no longer strong enough to guarantee the memory
reliability.
High performance servers are typically expected to have Chipkill-Correct level
protection, that is the ability to correct errors due to failures of a DRAM chip with
12.5% storage overhead [10, 11]. Chipkill-Correct was first implemented by striping
data across multiple chips so that a single error correction and double error detection
(SEC-DED) code could be used to correct errors due to a chip failure [10]. The bit-
level Chipkill-Correct code had high power consumption and low system performance
and so symbol-based Chipkill-Correct was proposed for x4 DRAM systems in [12,13].
This scheme activated 36 chips across two ranks for every memory access and thus
also had high power consumption and lower timing performance.
To reduce the power consumption, many systems moved to x8 or x16 DRAMs,
which activate fewer chips per memory access. For instance, V-ECC [14] activates
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18 x8 chips across two ranks while LOT-ECC [15] and Multi-ECC [16] only activate
nine chips per x8 rank. Although LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC can reduce the memory
power by an average of more than 25% compared to Chipkill-Correct, they cannot
fully correct a chip failure at run time.
In order to activate fewer chips and maintain high reliability, many systems employ
two-tier schemes [14–18], where the first tier is used for error detection and the second
tier is used for error correction. For example, V-ECC [14] uses two check symbols
in the first tier to perform error detection and the third check symbol in the second
tier to perform error correction. The second tier is usually cached to reduce the read
latency for error correction and the write frequency for ECC updates.
Existing schemes such as those in [15,16] also rely on replacement of faulty chips
to extend the lifetime of the DRAM memory systems. Some commercial systems use
memory sparing or bit-steering [16,19,20] to re-route the faulty bits or re-route data
from a faulty chip to a healthy chip. This not only reduces the usable physical memory
size but also increases the overhead required to perform re-routing or mapping.
In this work we propose a very different approach to providing at least Chipkill-
Correct error protection for commodity DRAM systems. Our approach is based on
the use of stronger symbol based codes which are chosen to handle the constraints of
different memory systems. Use of a stronger code adds very little overhead to existing
systems. Our synthesis results in 28nm node show that the decoding latencies of these
codes are very small and do not affect the DRAM timing performance. Moreover,
unlike the existing multi-tiered schemes, our schemes do not require extra memory
read/write operations to access data or to do error correction.
Furthermore, instead of employing chip sparing to increase the lifetime of memory
systems, we make use of erasure correction, where an erasure is defined as an error
whose location is known. We utilize the machine check architecture (MCA) [20, 21]
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to record the error information of each chip. Once the number of errors in a certain
chip increases beyond a threshold, this chip is marked as faulty and errors due to this
chip are treated as erasures.
We present five erasure and error correction (E-ECC) schemes that provide at
least Chipkill-Correct reliability for x4, x8 and x16 DRAM systems. All the proposed
E-ECC schemes can correct errors due to a chip failure on the fly and can correct one
additional random error when the chip is marked as faulty. In order to demonstrate
that our proposed schemes have low cost and low overhead, we synthesize all decoding
units using industrial 28nm library to obtain the corresponding latency, area and
power results. In addition, we analyze the tradeoffs between reliability and system
performance (timing, power and energy) of these proposed schemes and compare them
to the existing competing schemes.
Overall, we make the following key contributions in the design of reliable 2D
DRAM systems:
• For x4 DRAM systems, we present three schemes that all have 12.5% storage
overhead but differ in the number of ranks being activated (one or two). The
specific ECC codes used in these three schemes are rotational (144,128) code
over GF(24) and RS (36,32) code over GF(28). The schemes that activate two
ranks per memory access have lower timing, power and energy performance but
higher reliability compared to the one that activates only one rank.
• For x8 DRAM systems, we propose a scheme which is also based on the RS
(36,32) code over GF(28). It accesses two ranks per memory access and has the
lowest power consumption and highest energy efficiency among all five schemes.
• For x16 DRAM systems, we propose a scheme which is based on the RS (20,16)
code over GF(28). This scheme activates two ranks per memory access, has
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storage overhead of 25% but has the highest timing performance among all the
schemes.
This work appeared in ACM MEMSYS Conference [22] and IEEE Transactions
on Computers [23].
1.3 3D DRAM Reliability
The 3D die-stacked DRAM is an excellent candidate for high performance com-
puter systems. It has lower access latency, lower power consumption and higher
bandwidth [6, 24]. In this work, we consider an HBM-like structure where multiple
dies are stacked on top of the logic die; stacking is achieved by the use of through
silicon vias (TSV).
Unfortunately, 3D DRAM is likely to be less reliable than 2D DRAM because
of additional errors due to its higher integration density. The increase of errors in
2D DRAM due to higher density has been well documented in [3, 4, 25, 26]. The 2D
DRAM errors that were due to transient and permanent single bit, column, row and
bank failures are expected to be present in 3D DRAM as well. In addition, 3D DRAM
will incur errors caused by TSV failures. Thus, designing a reliable memory system
using an error-prone 3D die-stacked DRAM is quite a challenge.
Added to this challenge is the fact that in a 3D DRAM (such as HBM), data block
from a lower level cache is stored in a single bank and not striped across multiple
banks as in 2D DRAM. While this results in lower power and higher performance as
shown in [27,28], it makes the design of a reliable system even more challenging. For
instance, if a bank fails, an entire cache line is corrupted. Traditional ECC schemes for
2D DRAMs such as Chipkill-Correct [11], virtualized-ECC [14], LOT-ECC [15] and
Multi-ECC [16] were all based on data being striped across different banks. Hence,
these schemes cannot be extended to handle 3D DRAM.
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In recent years, several schemes have been proposed for improving the reliability of
3D DRAM. These include Subarraykill [29], Resilient-DRAM-Caches [30], Efficient-
RAS [28], Citadel [27] and Parity-Helix [31]. Subarraykill [29] proposes an ECC
scheme for the specialized Tezzaron Octopus structure, which allows for the data to
be striped across several subarrays. The ECC design in [30] focuses on the protection
of the last level cache; the single bit error correction code and small size of cyclic
redundancy code (CRC) [5] are not strong enough for 3D DRAM memory. Citadel [27]
and Efficient-RAS [28] are two contemporary systems that have been designed for
HBM-like memory. Both use two tiered schemes, where the first tier is used to
only detect [27], or detect as well as correct [28], and the second tier is used to
correct errors detected but not corrected by the first tier. Efficient-RAS [28] uses
symbol based rotational code to correct errors due to small granularity faults while
Citadel [27] uses CRC-32 to detect errors and relies on tier-2 code to correct all errors.
Since small granularity faults account for 70% of all faults [26], this can affect the
timing performance. Parity-Helix [31] focuses on the tier-2 code design where the
ECC parity bits are twisted so that the system can recover from errors due to a single
dimensional failure in a multi-dimensional memory system.
1.3.1 ECC For 3D DRAM In CPU Systems
In this work, we propose rate-adaptive two-tiered error correction scheme (RATT-
ECC) to deal with errors due to transient and permanent 3D failures in an HBM-like
3D DRAM system that services CPUs. Here, the memory is organized into 8 data
dies and one additional die is used to store the error correction (ECC) bits. CPU
systems typically have data access size of 64B and so the proposed ECC scheme is
optimized for 64B access.
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In RATT-ECC, the tier-1 code is based on a Reed-Solomon (RS) code [5] to pro-
vide strong error detection and correction capability. The strong detection capability
reduces error leaks and the strong error correction capability decreases the frequency
of tier-2 activation. RATT-ECC can correct errors due to all small granularity faults
such as single bit, column or TSV failures by using tier-1 code. It needs tier-2 code
only for correcting errors due to large granularity faults such as row or bank failures.
RATT-ECC uses RS (70,64) as the tier-1 code. This code can be used to correct one
symbol error and detect five symbol errors. Since the undetected error probability of
tier-1 code is as low as 2.3 ·10−10, almost all errors can be corrected by the tier-2 code.
The tier-1 code can also be used as an erasure code and errors due to permanent TSV
failure can be easily corrected.
Furthermore, RATT-ECC has a mechanism to free up banks in the ECC die
to handle faulty data banks. It alters the rate of tier-1 and tier-2 codes so that
these codes need less parity storage allowing for 1 or 2 spare banks. Specifically, by
puncturing RS (70,64) code to RS (69,64) code, it frees up one ECC bank since RS
(69,64) requires five ECC banks to store its parity symbols. A second ECC bank can
be freed up by XORing the tier-2 parity symbols that were originally stored in two
ECC banks. Thus RATT-ECC can provide for a highly reliable 3D DRAM system
that is plagued with all types of faults.
Overall, we make the following key contributions in the design of a reliable 3D
DRAM system that services CPUs:
• Design of a rate-adaptive two-tiered ECC scheme with a total storage overhead
of 12.5% to correct errors due to small and large granularity faults. The strong
correction capability of tier-1 code reduces the number of activations of tier-2
code and the strong detection capability of tier-1 code avoids substantial error
leaks. Overall, the raw failure-in-time (FIT) rate is reduced by more than 1010x.
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• The rate adaptive feature of tier-1 code and tier-2 code allows for up to two
spare banks in the ECC die. Thus the memory system can reliably function
even after two data banks are marked faulty with very little overhead.
• The erasure correction capability of the tier-1 code is utilized to handle perma-
nent TSV failures with no performance overhead.
• The synthesis results in 28nm technology show that the proposed tier-1 code
has very small overhead in area, power and latency. Simulations on SPEC2006
benchmark shows that the timing performance drops by less than 2% compared
to the baseline scheme with no ECC.
This work appeared in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
[32].
1.3.2 ECC For 3D DRAM In GPU Systems
Graphics processing units (GPUs) play an increasingly significant role in high
performance computers. 3D DRAMs, e.g., high bandwidth memory (HBM) [33], are
projected to be widely adopted in GPU memory systems in the near future. In fact,
3D DRAMs have already been applied in some commercial GPU products, such as
Nvidia Tesla P100 [34] and AMD Radeon R9 FURY X GPU cards [35]. In this work,
we assume that 3D DRAM is organized into 8 dies, where each die holds both data
bits and ECC bits.
Designing an ECC scheme for GPU memory systems is more challenging than for
CPUs. The data fetch granularity from GPUs can vary and so designing an ECC
scheme for fixed sized data access is sub-optimal. Current GPU products support
different cache line sizes. For example, AMD GPUs, such as the RADEON series,
adopt 64B as the cache line size [36], whereas Nvidia uses 128B L2 cache line size
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in many of their GPU products. In some GPU products, the L2 cache line size can
be statically configured to operate in 2 different modes (32B or 128B) before a GPU
kernel is launched [37]. This is proposed with compiler level analysis to fully exploit
the varying degree of spatial locality in GPGPU applications. Furthermore, many
recent studies [38, 39] have shown that GPGPU applications exhibit mixed locality
data access patterns over application execution. Therefore, a lot of designs have been
proposed to dynamically predict and accommodate varying cache line sizes for the
L1 cache [39] as well as for the L2 cache [38].
Traditionally, ECC algorithms used in DRAMs were optimized for fixed sized data
accesses. Examples include CRC-16 for 32B accesses in [33], symbol-based code for
64B accesses in [28, 32]. However, applying an ECC scheme that is optimized for a
single data access size leads to suboptimal memory reliability or higher energy con-
sumption for the other data access sizes. For instance, an ECC algorithm optimized
for 64B access leads to additional energy consumption if the GPU data fetch size is
32B. Alternatively, an ECC algorithm optimized for 32B data results in lower relia-
bility compared to one that results in been designed for 64B data. Clearly, to better
support the diversity of cache configurations in GPUs and the performance feature of
the variable data fetch granularity runtime support for future GPUs, there is a strong
need to develop an adaptive and flexible ECC scheme.
In this work, we propose Config-ECC, an ECC scheme that not only supports
a diverse set of cache hierarchy configurations in different GPU cards in the static
mode but is also designed to handle variable data fetch granularities at runtime in the
dynamic mode with strong reliability and/or low energy consumption. Config-ECC
is based on a two-tiered ECC code: The tier-1 code is a product code [5] that has
strong error detection and correction capabilities. It can correct errors due to small
granularity faults (single bit, column, and TSV failures) and detect errors with large
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granularity fault (row or bank failures) with very low silent data corruption rate.
The tier-2 code, which is based on an XOR structure and stored in the data banks,
is launched for correcting errors due to large granularity faults.
Config-ECC is built around a core 32B ECC scheme that can be easily extended
to support 64B and 128B accesses. The product code structure of Config-ECC helps
address the mismatch between data access size and fixed size ECC scheme. Basically,
the inner code is optimized to have very strong detection capability for 32B access and
the combination of inner code and outer code provides for very strong reliability for
64B access. Config-ECC improves the silent data corruption rate (SDC) by 200 times
compared to the 32B ECC scheme in the HBM standard and by 20 times compared
to the latest 64B ECC schemes [27,32]. For applications that prefer small cache line
size (32B), Config-ECC has significantly lower energy consumption compared to 64B
and 128B ECC schemes and also provide stronger reliability than that of a fixed 32B
ECC scheme.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We designed a two-tiered ECC scheme to provide strong error protection for
mixed 32B, 64B and 128B accesses in 3D HBM memory systems used in high
performance GPUs. These three ECC schemes share the same core structure
and can be configured statically and dynamically to support different sized
accesses.
• Compared to a fixed 32B ECC scheme, Config-ECC increases the reliability by
200 times for both static and dynamic modes.
• Compared to a fixed 64B ECC scheme, Config-ECC increases the reliability by
20 times when the access size is 64B or larger. Also, Config-ECC can choose to
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only read 32B of data to reduce the energy by 21% in the static mode and 17%
in the dynamic mode.
This work has been submitted to MICRO 2017 [40].
1.4 Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, basics of 2D and 3D DRAM architecture, error characteristics,
existing ECC schemes for 2D and 3D DRAM and the machine check architecture
(MCA) are introduced.
Chapter 3 focuses on ECC schemes for 2D DRAM systems. The data access
pattern and decoding flowchart for all E-ECC schemes are presented. The tradeoff
between system performance and reliability for each scheme is also analyzed.
Chapter 4 focuses on an ECC scheme, RATT-ECC, for an HBM system that
services CPU requests. The operation of RATT-ECC is described in detail and the
timing performance, reliability and implementation overhead are also analyzed.
Chapter 5 focuses on an ECC scheme, Config-ECC, for an HBM system that
supports GPU data access sizes of 32B, 64B and 128B. Config-ECC design is described
in detail along with the reliability and energy analysis.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 DRAM Memory Systems
2.1.1 2D Commodity DRAM Architecture
A DRAM memory system is organized into channels, ranks, chips and banks [41].
The DRAM memory controller (MC) acts as an interface between the last level cache
and the DRAM. It can access data from one or more channels. Each channel consists
of dual in-line memory modules (DIMMs), each of which consists of one or more
ranks. A rank is the minimum unit that is activated in a read or write access. Each
rank is composed of multiple chips (also called devices) and the number of chips to
be activated depend on the size of the data bus width.
Processor
DIMM1
DIMM2
DIMM3
DIMM4
Channel 1 Channel 2
Chip 0 Chip 1 Chip 8
Banks in a chip
bank 0
bank 7
Rank 0 Rank 1
Figure 2.1: Logical View Of A DRAM Based Memory System
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For DDR3, the I/O width (N) is typically 4, 8 or 16 bits. Since the 64 bit data path
is fixed, a rank consists of 64/N chips. A DRAM system built with sixteen x4 DRAM
chips is referred to as a 16x4 system. The common DRAM system configurations are
16 x4, 8 x8 and 4 x16 (number of chips per rank x data I/O width). In an x4 system,
there are 8 extra ECC bits for every 64 bits data resulting in two extra ECC chips
per rank. In an x8 system, one extra chip is used for ECC chip per rank. The DRAM
architecture for a x8 system is shown in Figure 2.1.
In DDR3 systems, data is accessed in the burst mode; typically, burst length is
eight or four (chopped burst) [42]. A burst length of eight means that eight beats of
data are transferred per memory access [41]. Some DRAM systems operate in the
lock-step mode [14, 41]. In such a mode, two physical channels operate as a single
logical channel. A single 64B cache line is fetched using two memory channels; one
half of the cache line is accessed in the first channel while the second half is obtained
from the second channel.
2.1.2 3D DRAM Memory Architecture
There are several prototypes of 3D DRAM, for example, high bandwidth memory
(HBM) [7, 33], hybrid memory cube (HMC) [43] and Wide-I/O [44]. In this thesis,
we consider a 3D DRAM architecture to be similar to HBM [7, 33]. For each die-
stacked HBM, typically, there are eight dies to store data, where each die has eight
or sixteen banks. A single stack is anticipated to support up to eight channels. Since
each stack supports multiple channels, it provides larger bandwidth than 2D DRAM.
Each channel accesses an independent set of DRAM banks. A data line is stored in the
same bank in HBM in contrast to a data line being striped across multiple banks in
conventional 2D DRAMs. Through-silicon-via (TSV) connects different data dies [45].
Each channel has data width of 128b as the most common setting in [7]; hence, there
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Figure 2.2: 32B vs. 64B Accesses in HBM2 (Pseudo Channel Mode)
are 128 TSV lines per channel. Since there are eight channels, there are a total of
1024 TSV lines per stack.
HBM has two different architectures: HBM1 and HBM2. The access unit is only
32B in HBM1 [7] while the access unit can be 32B or 64B in HBM2 [33]. Each bank
in HBM2 consists of two sub-banks and these two sub-banks can be controlled by
two sub-channels. The HBM2 architecture is shown in Figure 2.2. The I/O for each
channel is 128b with additional 16b for ECC in [33,46], which is different from HBM1.
Two modes are supported in HBM2: the legacy mode and the pseudo channel mode.
In the legacy mode, in each request, 256b of data is read out from a single bank.
Therefore, a 32B DRAM access consists of 2 bursts (1 cycle) with 128b accessed per
burst through a single channel. Here, a burst means the rising edge or falling edge of
a clock cycle.
To reduce activation power, the pseudo channel mode is proposed in the HBM2
standard 1. In the pseudo channel mode, a single channel is divided into two sub-
channels each of size 64 bits. So a 32B access consists of 4 bursts (2 cycles) with 64b
1HBM1 only supports the legacy mode while HBM2 supports both legacy and pseudo channel
mode.
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Figure 2.3: 3D HBM-Like Structure With An ECC Die
per access. HBM2 has separate pins for row and column commands and this dual
command feature allows HBM2 to simultaneously issue row and column commands
to two different banks. Thus, in a 64B access, two sub-channels are activated at the
same time and the 64B access consists of 4 bursts (2 cycles).
In Chapter 4, we assume an HBM structure that consists of 8 data dies and an
additional ECC die to store the ECC bits as in [27]. Figure 2.3 shows the internal
stack organization of such a memory. The parity check symbols for tier-1 and tier-2
code are stored in the ECC die. In each memory request, 512b of data is accessed
from a certain bank of a single data die and the corresponding ECC bits are read
from a certain bank in the ECC die. The data is read over four beats with 128 bits
being read in each beat as shown in Figure 2.4. Eight data bits form a symbol and
so a single TSV failure leads to only one symbol error as shown in Figure 2.4 as well.
In Chapter 5, we assume that the memory system that services GPUs uses the
latest HBM2 standard [33] and develop ECC schemes for the pseudo channel mode.
The ECC bits are stored in the data banks instead of being housed in another die as
in [27]. In each access, the ECC bits are read along with the data bits. For 32B and
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Figure 2.4: 512b or 64 Symbols Are Read From A Bank In A Data Die
64B accesses, the burst length is 4 and considered as one request. For 128 access, we
assume that the system issues two 64B requests.
2.2 DRAM Error Characteristics
2.2.1 2D Commodity DRAM Errors
DRAM errors can be broadly classified into soft errors and hard errors. Soft
errors are caused by transient faults which occur randomly and cause incorrect data
to be read from a memory location; they disappear when the location is overwritten.
Hard errors are caused by permanent faults or intermittent faults. A permanent
fault causes a memory location to consistently return an incorrect value, such as a
stuck-at-0 fault. An intermittent fault causes a memory location to sometimes return
incorrect values. Note that a single fault can result in multiple error instances [3, 4].
DRAM faults consist of single-bit, single-word, single column, single row, single-
bank, multiple-bank and multiple-rank failures [3]. We use the definition from [3] and
present the terminology here:
1. Single-bit: All errors map to a single bit.
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Table 2.1: DRAM Fault Modes in Hopper
Fault Mode Total Faults Transient Permanent
Single-bit 78.9% 42.1% 36.8%
Single-column 5.9% 0.0% 5.9%
Single-row 9.2% 1.8% 7.4%
Single-bank 4.3% 0.4% 3.9%
Multiple-bank 0.6% 0.0% 0.6%
Multiple-rank 1.0% 0.2% 0.8%
Summary 99.9% 44.5% 55.4%
2. Single-word: All errors map to a single word.
3. Single-column: All errors map to a single column.
4. Single-row: All errors map to a single row.
5. Single-bank: All errors map to a single bank.
6. Multiple-bank: Errors map to multiple banks.
7. Multiple-rank: Errors map to multiple DRAMs in the same lane.
Table 2.1 shows a breakdown of DRAM faults from [26].
DRAM errors have been analyzed in detail in [2–4, 25, 47]. The study in [2, 3, 25]
shows that a large fraction of errors are hard errors and these manifest as repeating
errors occurring at the same address, row, column or chip. In addition, permanent
faults tend to be clustered [25]; these errors have strong correlations in space and
time. The repeated errors contaminate the nearby rows and columns and increase
dramatically in the presence of prior errors. The study in [2, 25] also shows that the
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number of errors in any memory system increase over time. A more recent analysis
of DRAM faults performed over a period of 15 months shows that while the failure
rate due to transient faults increases mildly, the failure rate due to permanent faults
is higher in the beginning and becomes almost the same as transient faults around
months six to eight [4]. It is projected that the failure rate would again increase
towards the end of the device’s lifetime.
In general, if a chip has persistent errors, then that chip can be marked as faulty
and all data from that chip can be treated as erasures. Note that erasures are defined
as errors whose locations are known [5]. Thus if erasures can be corrected, the faulty
chip can continue to be used instead of being retired. In this work, we utilize the
error recording mechanism of machine-check architecture (MCA) [20, 21] to mark a
chip as faulty.
2.2.2 3D Die-Stacked DRAM Errors
For 3D DRAM errors, a better classification is based on the granularity of faults.
Small granularity faults are those due to single bit or single column and account
for 70% of all faults, and large granularity faults are due to row and bank failures
[3,4,26]. 3D DRAM also has errors due to TSV failures [27,28], which fall under small
granularity faults. In this work, we analyze the capability of the system to handle
errors due to small granularity and large granularity faults (transient and permanent).
To handle permanent faults such as TSV faults (small granularity) and bank faults
(large granularity), we also utilize the error recoding mechanism of MCA [21].
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2.3 Existing ECC Mechanisms
2.3.1 Existing Schemes in 2D DRAM
Chipkill-Correct is the most common error protection scheme for DRAM mem-
ory systems [2,10,11,48]. It can correct errors due to failure of one chip and also detect
errors due to two chip failures. The original Chipkill-Correct solution from IBM [10]
used single bit error correction and double bit error detection code (SEC-DED). Cur-
rent systems such as Sun UltraSPARC-T1/T2 [49] and AMD Opteron [50] systems
use symbol based Chipkill-Correct codes. An example of such a code is the rotational
(144,128) code [12], which is a (36,32) code over GF(24). In an x4 memory system,
this code results in activation of 36 devices across 2 ranks and thus consumes a lot
of power. Next we describe several methods that try to achieve a balance between
reduction in power consumption and Chipkill-Correct reliability.
Virtualized ECC (V-ECC) [14] provides Chipkill-Correct capability for x4
and x8 DRAM systems. It is based on a 3 check symbol code where 2 check symbols
are used for detection (tier-1) and a third check symbol is used for correction (tier-
2). In an x8 system, V-ECC activates 18 chips in 2 ranks. It caches the tier-2
symbols to reduce the read latency and write frequency. However, it still incurs extra
read/write operations to perform error correction or to update the ECC bits. The
storage overhead of V-ECC is 18.75%.
Localized and tiered ECC (LOT-ECC) [15] activates only nine chips per
rank in x8 DRAM systems to reduce power consumption. It uses multiple layers
of XOR operations to deal with memory errors. Data along with local and global
ECC parity bits are stored in the same DRAM row to improve access efficiency. If
errors are detected, global parity bits are read by a second access. LOT-ECC is not
a Chipkill-Correct solution since it can only correct a stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 chip
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failure. The storage overhead of LOT-ECC is 26.5%, which is higher than the existing
schemes.
Multi-line error correction (Multi-ECC) [16] also activates only nine chips
per rank in x8 DRAM systems. Multi-ECC uses a different approach where errors are
first detected along rows and then column checksums are used to locate the errors.
The row parity bits are then used to correct these errors. This method requires a
large number of data reads when an error is detected. In addition, since Multi-ECC
uses one’s complement for column checksums, it cannot fully detect errors due to
column failures. The storage overhead of this method is only 12.9%, which is a small
increase compared to Chipkill-Correct.
Adaptive Reliability Chipkill Correct (ARCC) [51] also provides two tiers
of error protection. It reduces the power consumption by activating only one rank
when there are no errors. When errors are detected, ARCC adaptively adjusts the
ECC strength by combining adjacent codewords to perform error correction. Once
two ranks are combined, the cache line size is increased from 64B to 128B. ARCC
does not increase the ECC storage overhead; the only overhead is that the last level
cache needs to be modified to accommodate both 64B and 128B cache lines.
Bamboo-ECC [52] is a recently proposed single-tier error protection scheme that
provides good system reliability with low storage overhead. It uses an 8-bit symbol
based RS code for x4 DRAM systems to handle error events ranging from correcting
single bit errors with 3.1% storage overhead to correcting errors due to two chip
failures with 25% storage overhead. Furthermore, by grouping per-pin data to form
ECC symbols, it is able to correct double pin failures and thus provides higher error
protection compared to Chipkill-Correct.
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2.3.2 Existing Schemes In 3D DRAM
We give a brief description of prior approaches on improving the reliability of 3D
Die-stacked DRAM [27–30]. Of these schemes, Efficient-RAS [28] and Citadel [27]
also focus on an HBM-like structure and are closest to our proposed scheme.
Subarraykill [29] corrects errors due to a subarray failure in Tezzaron Octopus
structure. A cache line is striped across a subset of subarrays; the number of subsets
depends on the page size. Due to this striped pattern of data storage, the ECC
schemes based on symbol-based code can be used.
Resilient-DRAM-Caches [30] uses ECC codes to protect tags and cache lines
in 3D DRAM caches. Single bit error correction (SEC) code is used to correct single
bit errors while cyclic redundancy check codes (CRCs) are used to detect multiple bit
errors. To recover multiple bit errors due to row or bank failures in a contaminated
cache line, a duplicate dirty cache line that is stored in another DRAM cache bank is
utilized. This approach has high storage overhead and is not strong enough to handle
errors in 3D DRAM.
Efficient-RAS [28] proposes a two tier error correction scheme with higher than
12.5% storage overhead. The first tier uses a symbol-based ECC code to correct errors
due to small granularity faults, while the second tier is a XOR-based correction code
(XCC) to correct the detectable but uncorrectable errors due to large granularity
faults. It proposes a strategy to deal with permanent TSV (or row) failures by using
spare TSVs (or rows). However, it does not have any strategy to handle permanent
bank failures.
Citadel [27] also uses a two tier ECC protection to handle small and large granu-
larity faults. For the first tier, Citadel uses CRC-32 to provide strong error detection
capability. After errors are detected, Citadel relies on multiple levels of parity (3DP)
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to recover from errors due to single bit, single column, single TSV faults as well as
row and bank failures. In this scheme, the cost of correcting errors is very high.
Citadel allocates 64 bits for each cache line; the metadata is located in ECC logic
die resulting in a 12.5% additional storage. Additional bits are used to address TSV
failures and for data recovery by 3DP. In addition, it provides for two spare banks to
handle bank failures.
Parity-Helix [31] focuses on design of the tier-2 code and allows the system
to recover from errors due to a single channel failure or a single die failure in a die-
stacked DRAM. The ECC core structure is based on RAID-5. The ECC parity blocks
in vertical and horizontal directions are twisted to form a helix structure which can
avoid a single dimensional fault in a multi-dimensional memory system. The storage
overhead is 26.8% for the overall ECC scheme with 14.3% for the tier-2 code.
2.4 Error Logging Architecture
The memory controller not only manages the data access from and to DRAM but
also performs error detection and correction. Many server systems utilize machine-
check architecture (MCA) [3, 21, 53, 54] to record detected errors in each machine.
MCA defines the facilities by which processor and system hardware errors are logged
and reported to the system software (operation system) [21]. These detected errors
include corrected and uncorrected error events but the MCA does not record the errors
due to miss error detection. Once errors are detected, the CPU sends a hardware
exception signal called a machine check exception (MCE) which must be handled by
the processor.
When an MCE event occurs, the memory controller logs corrected error events in
registers provided by the MCA [3,21]. Each machine’s operating system is configured
to poll the MCA registers once in a certain period (e.g., few seconds) and record
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any exception event. These console logs contain a variety of information about the
physical address associated with the error, the time that the error was corrected, the
type of memory access (e.g., read or write), the type of error (corrected or uncorrected)
and the ECC syndrome associated with the error.
For 2D DRAM memory systems, if the number of errors is larger than a threshold
value (the threshold value is system-dependent), the chip is marked as faulty by the
memory controller. The erasure correction scheme is launched and the corresponding
ECC mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 3.
For 3D DRAM memory systems, if the number of errors is larger than a threshold
value (the threshold value is system-dependent), the specific TSV line or bank can be
marked as faulty by the memory controller. If a TSV is marked as faulty, we utilize
the erasure correction capability of the tier-1 code and if the data banks are marked
as faulty, we reduce the parity storage of the tier-1 and tier-2 codes to free up banks
in the ECC die as discussed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
2D DRAM ECC SCHEMES
In this chapter we describe our work on designing reliable ECC schemes that
provide at least Chipkill-Correct capability for different commodity DRAM systems,
namely, x4, x8 and x16 systems. The goal is to balance the tradeoffs between per-
formance, reliability, storage overhead and power consumption by designing ECC
schemes tailored to the characteristics of the different DRAM systems.
Our solution is to use erasure and error correction code (E-ECC) to deal with
random errors as well as errors due to chip failures. We make use of erasure codes to
correct the errors due to a chip that has already been marked as faulty by MC. This
helps in increasing the lifetime of the device. We believe that this is a more cost-
effective way of increasing the lifetime compared to systems that use chip sparing or
bit steering. Furthermore, our proposed schemes do not incur extra read or write
operations to perform ECC correction or to update ECC bits.
We describe the proposed E-ECC schemes for x4 DRAM systems in Section 3.1,
for x8 DRAM systems in Section 3.2 and for x16 DRAM systems in Section 3.3. For
each scheme, we describe the data access pattern and the decoding flowchart. The
actual decoding algorithms and the corresponding synthesis results are included in
the Appendix A and Section 3.4, respectively. We also analyze the tradeoff between
the reliability and system performance (timing, power and energy efficiency) for our
proposed schemes and the existing schemes in Section 3.5.
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3.1 Proposed E-ECC Schemes For x4 DRAM Systems
For x4 DRAM systems, we present three schemes that all have 12.5% storage
overhead but differ in the number of ranks being activated. E-ECC Schemes 1 and 2
operate in lockstep mode while E-ECC Scheme 3 only activates one rank per access.
The specific ECC codes used in these three schemes are rotational (144,128) code
over GF(24) and RS (36,32) code over GF(28). The schemes that activate two ranks
per memory access have lower timing, power and energy performance but higher
reliability compared to the one that activates only one rank.
3.1.1 E-ECC Scheme 1 - x4 DRAM System
Chipkill-Correct uses 4-check symbol codes to correct errors due to a single chip
failure and detect errors due to two chip failures. We use rotational (144,128) code [12]
as the representative Chipkill-Correct code in this work. Here, 36 devices are activated
across two ranks in each access. Each device provides four bits of data per beat, that
is, 36x4 = 144 bits per beat, to the ECC decoding unit. Each set of 144 bits is
decoded to obtain 128 data bits and a total of 4x128 = 512 data bits is sent to the
last level cache.
The rotational (144,128) code has a minimum distance of 4 and so this code can
support the following cases: (i) single symbol correction and double symbol detec-
tion, (ii) single erasure correction, (iii) single erasure and single error correction, (iv)
double erasure correction and (v) double erasure and single error detection. Cur-
rent Chipkill-Correct x4 systems implement only single symbol correction and double
symbol detection (case (i)). Here, we propose an enhancement which makes use of
the same (144,128) code to handle erasures; we refer to it as E-ECC Scheme 1.
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Figure 3.1: Overview Of The Decoding Algorithm For E-ECC Scheme 1
If a chip is marked as faulty, it leads to a single erasure and Scheme 1 performs
single erasure correction (case (ii)). When one more random error occurs in another
chip, Scheme 1 can still correct it (case (iii)). The decoder first checks if it is a single
erasure event. If so, case (ii) is executed; otherwise, case (iii) is activated. If a second
chip fails, the MC marks it as faulty. The decoder first checks if it is a double erasure
event. If so, double erasure correction (case (iv)) is implemented; otherwise, double
erasure and single error detection (case (v)) is activated. The decoding flowchart
for Scheme 1 is shown in Figure 3.1 and the details of the decoding algorithm are
included in Appendix A.
3.1.2 E-ECC Scheme 2 - x4 DRAM System
To enhance the error correction capability of x4 DRAM systems, we investigate
ECC codes operating in higher finite field. We combine data from two beats to obtain
256 data bits and 32 ECC bits. Since there is no RS (72,64) code over GF(24), we
move to GF(28). We propose using RS (36,32) in GF(28), which can be derived from
RS (255,251). RS (36,32) can provide double error correction, that is, it can correct
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double chip failures on the fly instead of only detecting them as in Scheme 1. We
refer to this method as E-ECC Scheme 2.
In Scheme 2, two ranks (with 18 chips per rank) are activated per access. In
each read/write, two consecutive 4-bit symbols from the same bank form a single
8-bit symbol, and thus a total of 36 symbols are read out. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
data access pattern. The proposed RS (36,32) E-ECC code has a minimum distance
of 5 and supports the following cases: (i) single error correction, (ii) double error
correction, (iii) single erasure correction, (iv) single erasure and single error correction
(v) double erasure correction and (vi) double erasure and single error correction.
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Figure 3.2: E-ECC Scheme 2. x4 DRAM Access Pattern Of Two Ranks.
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The default state of Scheme 2 is single error and double error correction. Since RS
code has a special algebraic structure, the decoder can use the syndrome to distinguish
between case (i) and case (ii) efficiently [55]. When a chip fails, it leads to a single error
in the E-ECC codeword and a single error can be corrected easily. When MC marks
this chip as faulty, the error becomes an erasure in an ECC codeword and the decoding
circuitry for single erasure correction (case (iii)) is activated. Correcting single erasure
is simpler compared to correcting single error (see Appendix A). Furthermore, if there
is an additional error in another chip, it can be corrected as well (case (iv)). We
assume that the errors build up over time and so a second faulty chip can start
generating repeated errors. When MC marks the second chip as faulty, the E-ECC
decoder activates double erasure correction (case (v)). Once two chips are marked as
faulty, it can correct one more random error (case (vi)). The decoding flowchart is
shown in Figure 3.3 and details of the decoding algorithm for each case is given in
Appendix A.
3.1.3 E-ECC Scheme 3 - x4 DRAM System
Although Scheme 2 improves the reliability compared to Chipkill-Correct and E-
ECC Scheme 1, it still activates 36 devices and consumes significant amount of power.
This motivates us to find another scheme that activates fewer chips at the cost of some
loss in reliability. We investigate codes in GF(24) and GF(28) with the constraint that
18 chips can be activated in each access. Under this constraint, in each beat, 72 bits
(64 data bits + 8 ECC bits) are accessed from 18 chips. Since there is no RS (18,16)
code over GF(24), we move to GF(28).
In GF(28), the only available code is RS (9,8), which has a minimum distance
of 2 and so cannot even correct one single error. However, if we combine data from
two beats (144 bits), there are two candidates: one is the rotational (144,128) code
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and the other is the RS (18,16) code over GF(28). Rotational code cannot correct
one chip failure (there are 2 x4 symbol errors due to a chip failure) and hence it
is not suitable. The RS (18,16) code has minimum distance of 3 and can perform
single error correction. It seems to be used in AMD Chipkill-Correct [52]. Although
this code provides Chipkill-Correct capability, we choose a stronger code whose error
correction capability is competitive with the other proposed schemes. Specifically,
we choose RS (36,32) code over GF(28); the corresponding scheme is referred to as
Scheme 3.
In Scheme 3, four consecutive 4-bit symbols from the same bank contribute to-
wards a codeword. Figure 3.4 describes the corresponding data access pattern. As
mentioned earlier, the RS (36,32) code has a minimum distance of 5 and supports
the following cases: (i) single error correction, (ii) double error correction, (iii) double
erasure correction, (iv) double erasure and single error correction (v) double erasure
and double error detection.
The default state of Scheme 3 is also single error and double error correction.
When a chip fails, it leads to two errors in the E-ECC codeword and these two errors
can be corrected on the fly. When MC marks a chip as faulty, the decoding circuitry
for double erasure correction (case (iii)) is activated. The double erasure correction
methods for Schemes 2 and 3 are different. In Scheme 2, two chip failures lead to
two erasure symbols in a codeword, which may not be adjacent. In Scheme 3, one
chip failure leads to double erasures and these two erasure symbols are adjacent in a
codeword.
Correcting two erasures is simpler compared to correcting two errors (see Appendix
A) and these two erasure addresses are consecutive in Scheme 3. Furthermore, if there
is an additional error in another chip, it can be corrected as well (case (iv)). If a second
chip fails, there are two erasures (from the chip marked faulty) and two errors (from
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the other faulty chip) which can be detected but not corrected (case (v)). Note that
the system cannot use case (iv) and case (v) at the same time and a choice has to
be made. For DRAM systems whose errors increase over time, the MC can activate
case (iv) decoder, and once the number of single errors is larger than a threshold, it
can activate the circuitry for case (v). The decoding flowchart is shown in Figure 3.5
and details of the decoding algorithm for each case is given in the Appendix A.
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Figure 3.4: E-ECC Scheme 3. x4 DRAM Access Pattern Of One Rank
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Figure 3.6: E-ECC Scheme 4. x8 DRAM Access Pattern
3.2 Proposed E-ECC Schemes For x8 DRAM Systems
3.2.1 E-ECC Scheme 4 - x8 DRAM System
In an x8 DRAM system, nine chips (8 data chips + 1 ECC chip) are accessed
every time and since fewer chips are activated compared to x4 DRAM, the power
consumption is lower. Hence, a lot of research effort has focused on designing Chipkill-
Correct x8 DRAM systems [14–16,51,56].
Deriving a Chipkill-Correct solution for x8 DRAM with low overhead is still quite
a challenge. If only one rank is activated, in each beat, nine symbols are accessed
from nine chips. A possible choice is the RS (9,8) code over GF(28). Unfortunately,
this code can only detect a single symbol error and thus is not suitable. If two beats of
data are combined, RS (18,16) code can be used over GF(28) to perform single error
correction. However, since one faulty chip leads to two error symbols per codeword,
this code can not correct them. To provide Chipkill-Correct protection, either an
extra ECC chip (3-check symbol code) has to be used or the extra ECC symbols have
to be stored in another rank like [14].
Our solution is to operate the x8 DRAM system in lock-step mode as in Intel [19],
HP [57] and Dell [58] systems. In the lock-step mode, two ranks are activated and
in each beat, 144 bits (128 data bits + 16 ECC bits) are accessed from 18 chips
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across two ranks. If we use the rotational (144,128) code, when a chip fails, the faulty
chip leads to 2 x4 error symbols in a codeword and since this code cannot correct
two random errors, it is not Chipkill-Correct. In GF(28), the RS (18,16) code is a
possible choice. It can correct errors due to a chip failure. When MC marks a chip
as faulty, it can correct single erasure and detect one more random error in another
chip. However, we choose a stronger code, namely, RS (36,32), since it has better error
correction capability compared to RS (18,16) and the same 12.5% storage overhead.
We refer to this scheme as E-ECC Scheme 4.
In each beat, 2x9 = 18 symbols are read out from two ranks and a total of
2x18 = 36 symbols are accessed in two beats. Figure 3.6 demonstrates the data
access pattern of Scheme 4. As mentioned earlier, the RS (36,32) code supports: (i)
single error correction, (ii) double error correction, (iii) double erasure correction,
(iv) double erasure and single error correction (v) double erasure and double error
detection. Scheme 4 uses the same RS (36,32) code as Scheme 3, though their access
patterns are different (Scheme 4 is designed for x8 DRAM systems while Scheme 3
is for x4 DRAM systems). The decoding flow of Scheme 4 is the same as Scheme
3 (shown in Figure 3.5). When none of the chips are marked as faulty, Scheme 4
performs cases (i) and (ii). When a chip is marked as faulty, both symbols from
that chip are treated as erasures. The decoder checks whether it is a double erasure
event. If so, it launches double erasure correction (case (iii)); otherwise, it activates
double erasure and single error correction (case (iv)) or double erasure and double
error detection (case (v)). Note that case (iv) and case (v) cannot be chosen at the
same time.
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Figure 3.7: E-ECC Scheme 5. x16 DRAM Access Pattern
3.3 Proposed E-ECC Schemes For x16 DRAM Systems
3.3.1 E-ECC Scheme 5 - x16 DRAM System
x16 DRAM activates fewer number of chips per rank compared to x4 and x8
DRAM systems and thus has even lower power. Since each rank has four chips for
data, there has to be at least one additional chip per rank to provide Chipkill-Correct
reliability. Thus, such a scheme results in a storage overhead of 25%. If only one rank
is activated, five 16-bit symbols are read out in each beat. This can be configured
into ten 8-bit symbols and the RS (10,8) code over GF(28) can be used. While the
RS (10,8) code can correct a single symbol error, it cannot correct double errors due
to a faulty chip. The RS (5,4) code over GF(216), on the other hand, can detect a
faulty chip but cannot correct the errors due to that faulty chip. If two beats of data
are combined, the RS (20,16) code over GF(28) or the RS (10,8) code over GF(216)
can be used. Unfortunately, both these codes cannot correct errors due to a faulty
chip. Hence, we move to x16 DRAM systems that operate in the lock-step mode.
When two ranks are activated, in each beat, 160 bits (128 data bits + 32 ECC
bits) are accessed. If RS (20,16) code over GF(28) is used, double errors due to a
single faulty chip can be corrected. Although RS (10,8) code over GF(216) is also
a Chipkill-Correct code, RS (20,16) over GF(28) provides stronger and more flexible
33
error correction capability with the same 25% storage overhead. It can correct two
random symbol errors in two different chips and also can correct two symbol errors in
a single chip. Hence, we choose RS (20,16) code over GF(28) as our E-ECC Scheme
5.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the data access pattern. Here two ranks with five chips per
rank are activated each time. The 16 bits per chip are organized into two 8-bit symbols
in a codeword. The proposed RS (20,16) code also has a minimum distance of 5 and
supports the following cases: (i) single error correction, (ii) double error correction,
(iii) double erasure correction, (iv) double erasure and single error correction (v)
double erasure and double error detection. Scheme 5 has the same decoding flow as
Schemes 3 and 4 (also shown in Figure 3.5), though its access pattern is quite different.
As before, when none of the chips are marked as faulty, Scheme 5 performs cases (i)
and (ii). When a chip is marked as faulty, one 16-bit symbol failure from that chip
is treated as two 8-bit erasures. The decoder checks whether it is a double erasure
event. If so, Scheme 5 launches double erasure correction (case (iii)); otherwise, it
activates double erasure and single error correction (case (iv)) or double erasure and
double error detection (case (v)). Note that case (iv) and case (v) cannot be used at
the same time.
3.4 Synthesis Results
We implemented the E-ECC decoders in Verilog hardware description language
and synthesized them with a 28nm industrial process. The synthesis was done in
collaboration with Supreet Jeloka of University of Michigan. Recall that Scheme 1 is
based on the rotational (144,128) code, Schemes 2, 3, 4 are based on the RS (36,32)
code over GF(28), and Scheme 5 is based on the RS (20,16) code over GF(28). The
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latency, power consumption and area of each block ini the three E-ECC codes are
presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
The two main hardware components are finite field multiplication and finite field
inversion. We used a fully parallel implementation for finite field multiplication. We
implemented finite field inversion using a look-up table of size 16× 4 for GF(24) and
256×8 for GF(28). The syndrome calculation unit is activated in every read operation
and so it is important that its latency be minimized. We implemented this unit using
144 GF(24), 144 GF(28) and 80 GF(28) multiplications for rotational (144,128) code,
RS(36,32) code and RS (20,16) code, respectively, followed by a tree of XOR gates.
Latency: The syndrome calculation unit of Scheme 1 (based on the (144,128)
code) has a latency of 0.41ns. If the syndrome vector is not zero and the error event
is single error, correcting the errors takes an additional 0.41ns. This low latency
comes at the cost of additional area due to parallelization. If a chip is marked as
faulty, single erasure correction takes 0.3ns. In addition to the erasures, if there is
one more random error, it takes another 1.1ns. If two chips are marked as faulty,
Scheme 1 takes 0.39ns to do double erasure correction. If there is one more random
error, Scheme 1 can detect this error but can not correct it, and the corresponding
timing delay is also 0.39ns.
The syndrome calculation unit of Scheme 2 (based on RS (36,32) code) takes
0.48ns. If the syndrome vector is not zero, RS (36,32) can classify whether it is a single
error event or a double error event. Single error correction takes an additional 0.47ns,
making the total latency 0.95ns. Double error correction takes an additional 1.07ns,
making the total latency 1.55ns. When a chip is marked as faulty, Scheme 2 checks
whether it is a single erasure event. If so, it implements single erasure correction
with an additional 0.33ns; otherwise, it implements single erasure and single error
correction with an additional 0.33+0.68ns. In Schemes 3 and 4, when a chip is
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Table 3.1: Synthesis Results Using A 28nm Library - Latency
Rotational (144,128) Shortened RS (36,32) Shortened RS (20,16)
Code over GF(24) Code over GF(28) Code over GF(28)
Syndrome Calculation 0.41ns (∆) 0.48ns (Λ) 0.42ns(ν)
Corrects 1 error ∆ + 0.41ns Λ + 0.47ns ν + 0.47ns
Corrects 1 erasure ∆ + 0.30ns Λ + 0.33ns N/A
Corrects 1 erasure & 1 error ∆ + 0.30ns + 1.1 ns Λ + 0.33ns + 0.68ns N/A
Corrects 2 errors N/A Λ + 1.07ns ν + 1.07ns
Corrects 2 erasures ∆ + 0.39ns Λ + 0.78ns ν + 0.79ns
Corrects 2 erasures & 1 error N/ A Λ + 0.78ns + 0.87ns ν + 0.79ns + 0.86ns
marked as faulty, E-ECC decoder checks for double erasures. If so, it implements
double erasure correction with an additional 0.78ns; otherwise, it implements double
erasure and single error correction with an additional 0.78+0.87ns.
The syndrome calculation unit in Scheme 5 takes only 0.42ns because Scheme 5
is based on a smaller RS code. When none of the chips are marked faulty, Scheme 5
performs single error correction with an additional 0.47ns and double error correction
with an additional 1.07ns. When a chip is marked as faulty, double erasure correction
takes an additional 0.79ns. If there is one more random error, it performs double
erasure and single error correction with an additional 0.79+0.86ns.
Power: We list the static power and dynamic power consumption for each E-ECC
unit in Table 3.2. The dynamic power is based on input switching probability of 50%.
The syndrome calculation unit, which is activated in every memory access, also has
very small power consumption compared to the off-chip DRAM power consumption
(Overall, the power consumption values are very small and can be ignored).
Area: We also estimate the area of the E-ECC decoders. Schemes 1 to 5 have an
area of 12,793um2, 25,215um2, 20,389um2, 20,389um2 and 16,768um2 respectively.
Scheme 2 has the largest number of decoding units and hence it has the largest
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Table 3.2: Synthesis Results Using A 28nm Library - Power
(static power/dynamic power) Rotational (144,128) Shortened RS (36,32) Shortened RS (20,16)
Code over GF(24) Code over GF(28) Code over GF(28)
Syndrome Calculation 0.0083 mW / 14.5 mW 0.0192 mW / 14.6 mW 0.0141 mW / 11.2 mW
Corrects 1 error 0.0015 mW / 12.5 mW 0.0195 mW / 22.53 mW 0.0158 mW / 13.6 mW
Corrects 1 erasure 0.001 mW / 12.6 mW 0.0144 mW / 25.62 mW N/A
Corrects 1 erasure & 1 error 0.0043 mW / 9.48 mW 0.0271 mW / 21.44 mW N/A
Corrects 2 errors N/A 0.0374 mW / 16.54 mW 0.0326 mW / 11.1 mW
Corrects 2 erasures 0.0131 mW / 15.93 mw 0.0277 mW / 19.1 mW 0.0239 mW / 12.2 mW
Corrects 2 erasures & 1 error N/A 0.0353 mW / 19.97 mW 0.0306 mW / 13.7 mW
Table 3.3: Synthesis Results Using A 28nm Library - Area
Rotational (144,128) Shortened RS (36,32) Shortened RS (20,16)
Code over GF(24) Code over GF(28) Code over GF(28)
Syndrome Calculation 2001 um2 3970 um2 2533 um2
Corrects 1 error 2760 um2 2024 um2 1842 um2
Corrects 1 erasure 980 um2 1336 um2 N/A
Corrects 1 erasure & 1 error 5658 um2 3490 um2 N/A
Corrects 2 errors N/A 5043 um2 4575 um2
Corrects 2 erasures 1394 um2 3311 um2 2935 um2
Corrects 2 erasures & 1 error N/A 6041 um2 4883 um2
area. Schemes 3 and 4 both have the same area since they activate the same set of
decoding units. Scheme 5 has smaller area compared to Schemes 3 and 4 because it
uses a smaller sized RS code. Overall the area of the E-ECC decoders is quite small.
The largest E-ECC has an area of only 0.025mm2, which is fairly small compared to
a typical die size (≈ 100 mm2).
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Table 3.4: Simulation System Parameters
Processor
2 GHz single core (quad-core for multiprogrammed workloads),
4-way out-of-order, 128-entry reorder buffer
L1-I Cache 32KB, 4-way assoc., 1 cycle latency, 64B cache line
L1-D Cache 32KB, 8-way assoc., 1 cycle latency, 64B cache line
Shared L2 Cache
1MB (4MB for multiprogrammed workloads), 16-way assoc., 10
cycle latency, 64B cache line
Main Memory
DDR3-1600 (800MHz), FCFS, open page policy, 13.75ns
precharge time, 13.75ns CAS latency, 13.75ns RAS to CAS
latency, 8 banks per chip, 1 kB row buffers
3.5 Evaluation
We evaluate the timing performance of the five different E-ECC schemes by using
an open source full-system simulator, gem5 [59]. We model a 4-way out-of-order
processor with a two-level cache hierarchy. The L1 instruction and data caches are
private to each core while the L2 caches are shared. We also model a detailed DDR3
DRAM with data rate 1600 (MT/s). Table 3.4 describes the configuration of our
setup.
We use a detailed cycle-based DRAM simulator, DRAMSim2 [60], to evaluate
DRAM power consumption. We generate DRAM access traces from the aforemen-
tioned gem5 simulation setup. We then estimate the power consumption of the five
different schemes by simulating at least 2 million memory accesses from these traces.
We use the Micron 4Gb data sheets [61] for the input parameters of DRAMSim2.
3.5.1 Workloads
We evaluate the timing and power performance impact of the E-ECC schemes
using both sequential and multiprogrammed workloads. We use 11 DRAM-sensitive
sequential applications from the SPEC2006 benchmark suite (Table 3.5). We use the
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Table 3.5: Sequential And Multiprogrammed Workloads.
Benchmarks
bwaves, bzip2, cactusADM, h264ref, lbm, libquantum, mcf,
omnetpp, soplex, sphinx3, zeusmp
mix1(bzip2, mcf, omnetpp, libquantum)
mix2(libquantum, bwaves, zeusmp, cactusADM)
Simpoints [62] to identify a single, 250-million instruction representative region for
each sequential workload. In addition, we also evaluate the multi-core system per-
formance. We create two 4-core multiprogrammed workload mixes of the SPEC2006
benchmarks to realistically model the multiprogrammed application execution scenar-
ios. The workload mixes are also summarized in Table 3.5. For our multiprogrammed
simulations, in order to enable the start of different benchmarks in each workload at
the same time, we fast-forward two billion instructions from the program start and
simulate in detail until all the benchmarks have simulated for at least 250 million
instructions. We collect the statistics after the slowest benchmark has completed
simulating 250 million instructions.
3.5.2 Results And Analysis
In this part, we analyze the timing, power and energy performance of the five E-
ECC schemes and the three existing schemes (V-ECC, LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC).
In order to obtain the timing performance of the competing schemes (V-ECC, LOT-
ECC and Multi-ECC), we also synthesized the corresponding ECC units in 28 nm
technology. The syndrome calculation unit of V-ECC (using RS (19,16) code over
GF(28)) is 0.42ns, LOT-ECC (using multi-level one’s complement addition) is 0.52ns
and Multi-ECC (using RS (9,8) code over GF(216)) is 0.24ns.
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Figure 3.8: IPC Performance Of Sequential And Multiprogrammed Applications.
Schemes 1 And 2 Have The Same IPC Performance As Chipkill-Correct (Baseline).
LOT-ECC And Multi-ECC Have Performance Comparable To ECC x8 One Rank
And V-ECC Has Performance Comparable To E-ECC x8 Scheme 4.
Since the latencies of syndrome calculation of all schemes are within one memory
cycle (1.25ns), we add one additional cycle for each memory read access in gem5
simulation. We present the simulation results of all schemes in an error-free system.
All performance values are normalized to those of the x4 Chipkill-Correct baseline
scheme. Since Schemes 1 and 2 activate 36 x4 chips in two ranks as in the baseline,
they have identical timing, power and energy performance and are not shown in the
figures.
Timing Performance Comparison
Figure 3.8 shows the IPC performance of E-ECC Schemes 3, 4 and 5 for a subset
of our sequential and multiprogrammed workloads. We measure the performance
of the multiprogrammed workloads using the weighted speedup, which is given by∑
i
(IPCsharei )
(IPCsinglei )
[63, 64]. We use the geometric mean to report the average values.
Overall, the IPC performance increases as the data width increases from x4 to
x8 to x16. The performance improvement can be attributed to higher rank-level
parallelism. For example, Schemes 1 and 2 operate on one logical rank whereas
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Schemes 3 and 4 operate on two logical ranks and thus have better IPC performance.
Figure 3.8 shows that Scheme 5, which operates on four logical ranks, has the best IPC
performance among all the schemes. The improvement is 7% average, 21% maximum,
in multiprogrammed workloads and 18% in sequential workloads.
Of the existing schemes, V-ECC has the same configuration as E-ECC Scheme
4; the only difference is that V-ECC has to update the tier-2 ECC symbols when
there is a write request. Since V-ECC uses ECC cache to reduce the number of write
operations, we project that V-ECC has timing performance similar to E-ECC Scheme
4.
LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC both activate one x8 rank per memory access. While
the tier-2 ECC symbols of LOT-ECC are located in the same row as the accessed
data, they are located in another row in Multi-ECC. Both schemes also use ECC
cache to reduce the number of extra writes to update the tier-2 ECC symbols. Thus,
their best case performance is when the ECC cache has a 100% hit rate. This is
shown in Figure 3.8 under ECC x8 one rank.
Overall, we can expect the order of timing performance improvement to be E-ECC
Scheme 5 > LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC (ECC x8 one rank) > E-ECC Scheme 4 and
V-ECC > E-ECC Scheme 3 > E-ECC Scheme 1 and 2 and Chipkill-Correct.
Power Performance Comparison
We compare the DRAM power consumption of the candidate E-ECC schemes and
the existing schemes; the memory configurations are provided in detail in Table 3.6.
We generate the power consumption for each scheme by running the simulations in
DRAMSim2.
Figure 3.9 shows the power consumption of the sequential and multiprogrammed
SPEC workloads normalized to baseline. The power consumption is due to the off-
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Figure 3.9: Power Consumption Of Sequential And Multiprogrammed Workloads
Normalized To Chipkill-Correct. Schemes 1 And 2 Have The Same Power Perfor-
mance As Chipkill-Correct (Baseline). LOT-ECC And Multi-ECC Have Performance
Comparable To ECC x8 One Rank And V-ECC Has Performance Comparable To E-
ECC x8 Scheme 4.
chip DRAM; the power consumption due to ECC decoding in logic die is negligible
(20mW compared to 3W for DRAM) and is ignored. Scheme 4 obtains the best
power reduction among the five schemes; it achieves an average of 18%, a maximum
of 23.5% in multiprogrammed workloads and a maximum of 21.3% in sequential
workloads power reduction compared to baseline. Scheme 5 does not perform as well
due to its higher storage overhead (25% compared to 12.5%) and its 2 kB row buffer
compared to 1 kB row buffer used in x4 and x8 DRAM systems. Even though x16
DRAM activates fewer number of DRAM chips, the larger row buffer size adversely
affects its power performance.
Of the existing schemes, V-ECC has power performance comparable to our E-
ECC Scheme 4. LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC have the lowest power consumption since
they only activate one x8 rank per memory access. Overall, we can expect that the
power efficiency to be LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC (ECC x8 one rank) > E-ECC x8
Scheme 4 > E-ECC x4 Scheme 3 > E-ECC x16 Scheme 5 > E-ECC Scheme 1 and 2
and Chipkill-Correct.
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Table 3.6: Memory Configurations Of The Five E-ECC Schemes
ECC Channel I/O pin Ranks/Channel Chips/Rank Burst length Total Size Data Size
E-ECC x4 Scheme 1,2 1 x4 1 36 4 18GB 16GB
E-ECC x4 Scheme 3 1 x4 2 18 8 18GB 16GB
E-ECC x8 Scheme 4 1 x8 2 18 4 18GB 16GB
E-ECC x16 Scheme 5 2 x16 2 10 4 20GB 16GB
ECC x8 One rank 2 x8 2 9 8 18GB 16GB
Energy Performance Comparison
We next present our energy efficiency comparison for the different E-ECC schemes.
We derive the energy number by multiplying cycle per instruction (CPI) and power
for each benchmark with 250 million instructions and normalizing it to the energy
number of the baseline. Overall, Scheme 4 outperforms all other proposed schemes in
energy efficiency. Figure 3.10 shows that Scheme 3, Scheme 4 and Scheme 5 improve
the energy efficiency by a mean of 17.4%, 25.4% and 22%, respectively. Scheme 5
outweighs Schemes 3 or 4 only when the system is heavily used. However, if the
system is under utilized, Scheme 5 performs worse compared to other schemes. We
conclude that even though Scheme 5 has the best timing performance, it does not
have the best power performance and thus not the best energy performance.
Compared to the existing schemes, V-ECC also has energy efficiency comparable
to our E-ECC Scheme 4. LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC have the best energy efficiency;
they outperform E-ECC Scheme 4 by around 15%. Although LOT-ECC and Multi-
ECC have attractive system performance, they are not as reliable as Chipkill-Correct
schemes.
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Figure 3.10: Energy Efficiency Of Different E-ECC Schemes. Schemes 1 And 2 Have
The Same Energy Efficiency Performance As Chipkill-Correct (Baseline). LOT-ECC
And Multi-ECC Have Performance Comparable To ECC x8 One Rank And V-ECC
Has Performance Comparable To E-ECC x8 Scheme 4.
3.5.3 Reliability Analysis
In this section, we analyze the reliability of the competing schemes including
Chipkill-Correct, V-ECC [14], LOT-ECC [15], Multi-ECC [16] and our E-ECC Schemes.
Table 3.7 summarizes the error detection and correction capability of all schemes. For
each error event, we provide the rates for detectable and correctable errors (DCE),
detectable but uncorrectable errors (DUE) and silent data corruption (SDC). These
rates are calculated by performing 10 million Monte Carlo simulations.
First of all, all schemes can correct single bit error with 100% probability. If there
are multiple bit errors in a row, LOT-ECC uses 7-bit checksum to perform local error
detection and can only detect a whole row being stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1. However,
if there are multiple random bit errors in a row, LOT-ECC can not fully detect it.
The DCE rate of this scheme is 87.5% and the SDC rate is 12.5% as given in [15].
The rest of the schemes can correct multiple random bit errors in a single row.
Next we consider multiple bit errors in a single column. Multi-ECC uses one’s
complement to generate the column check sum and so if there are even number of
random errors or combinations of stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 failures in a single column,
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Multi-ECC can detect the errors using row parity bits but cannot use the column
checksums to locate them correctly. If every bit in a single column is flipped with
50% probability, then for 10 million runs, Multi-ECC has DCE of 75.01% and DUE
of 24.99%. In contrast, the rest of the schemes can deal with any combination of
random errors or permanent errors within a single column.
When a chip fails, it results in multiple column failures or row failures. LOT-
ECC can detect a chip failure with DCE less than 87.5%, which is the same as its row
failure event. Similarly, Multi-ECC has a chip failure probability which is the same
as its column failure probability. In contrast, all five E-ECC schemes can correct
errors due to a chip failure. When one chip fails and a single bit failure occurs in
another chip, Chipkill-Correct and V-ECC can fully detect this event. LOT-ECC can
detect this event with less than 87.5% probability while Multi-ECC can detect with
1−2−16 ≈ 99.9985% probability. Scheme 1 can detect this event with 100% probability
and Scheme 2 can correct with 100% probability. However, E-ECC Schemes 3, 4 and
5 cannot handle this error event.
If the MC marks a chip as faulty and there is one more random error in another
chip, all 5 E-ECC Schemes can correct it. V-ECC can also be designed to correct
one erasure and one error. LOT-ECC, which uses XOR operation to recover from a
faulty chip, cannot handle this error event. Multi-ECC can correct the extra error if
a spare chip is used to replace the faulty chip. If the MC marks a chip as faulty and
there is one more chip failure, Schemes 1 and 2 can fully correct the errors.
Overall, Scheme 2 has the highest error protection capability since it can correct
double chip failures on the fly. In addition, when two chips are marked as faulty, it
can correct errors due to a third chip failure.
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Table 3.7: Error Detection And Correction Comparison
Chipkill- V-ECC LOT-ECC Multi-ECC E-ECC E-ECC E-ECC E-ECC E-ECC
Correct [14] [15] [16] Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5
Single bit DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100%
failure DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0%
SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Row DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:87.5% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100%
failures DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0%
SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:12.5% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Column DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:75.01% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100%
failures DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:24.99% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0%
SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Single chip DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:87.5% DCE:75.01% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100% DCE:100%
failure DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:24.99% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0% DUE:0%
SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:12.5% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
3.5.4 Overhead Comparison
All proposed E-ECC Schemes (except for Scheme 5) have 12.5% storage overhead
while V-ECC, LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC have storage overheads more than 12.5%
(18.5%, 26.5% and 12.9%). Although Scheme 5 has 25% storage overhead, it only
utilizes one additional chip per four chips in x16 DRAM and does not incur extra
reads/writes to access additional ECC symbols. Furthermore, direct implementa-
tions of V-ECC, LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC incur extra reads or writes to access or
update tier-2 ECC symbols. In order to reduce the number of additional read/write
operations to access the tier-2 ECC symbols, all three schemes need the supports of
the ECC cache. OS needs to be modified and extra hardware units (ECC address
mapping) and extra ECC cache size are added to support ECC cache as indicated
in [14–16].
The E-ECC schemes rely on machine check architecture (MCA) to record the
corrected errors in each chip. MCA is already used in several servers [3, 21, 50] and
they are not the extra design to support our E-ECC schemes. When errors are caused
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Table 3.8: Overhead Comparison
Infrastructure Overhead
E-ECC • 12.5% storage overhead (25% for Scheme 5)
• ECC logic size from 12,793 to 25,215 um2
• Utilize MCA to mark chip as faulty
V-ECC • 18.5% storage overhead
• 4,375 um2 of ECC logic size
• ECC cache implementation and extra cache size
LOT-ECC • 26.5% storage overhead
• 4,107 um2 of ECC logic size (only tier-1)
• ECC cache implementation and extra cache size
• Rely on MCA to record errors and implement
spare rows, page retirement and chip replacement
to avoid error correction overhead
Multi-ECC • 12.9% storage overhead
• 762 um2 of ECC logic size (only tier-1)
• ECC cache implementation and extra cache size
• Read-before-write operation to update tier-2
• Rely on MCA to record errors and implement
spare rows, page retirement and chip replacement
to avoid error correction overhead
by permanent faults, V-ECC, LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC also rely on MCA to record
the errors and use spare rows, page retirement and chip replacement to avoid the
overhead of error correction. However, to use spare rows, page retirement and chip
replacement, there is significant hardware and software overhead to reroute, remap or
retire the data in DRAM. Overall, E-ECC Schemes use more logic die area but have
the lowest storage and infrastructure overhead compared to the existing schemes. All
these comparisons are given in Table 3.8.
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3.6 Summary
We presented five erasure and error correction (E-ECC) schemes that provide su-
perior error protection for commodity DRAMs. All our E-ECC schemes use strong
symbol based codes and provide higher error protection compared to existing sys-
tems. Furthermore, when a chip is marked faulty, our schemes make use of erasure
correction to increase the lifetime of the memory system with no additional cost.
Synthesis results show that the decoding latency of these codes is very small and
the additional latency does not affect the timing performance of the memory system.
Also, our schemes require no extra memory accesses to perform error correction and
more importantly, do not require any change in the memory architecture.
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Chapter 4
3D DRAM ECC SCHEMES FOR CPU
In this chapter we describe our work on designing an ECC scheme for an HBM-like
3D DRAM system for CPUs. The current ECC schemes either have low decoding
latency to correct errors due to small granularity faults and poor detection capability
for errors due to large granularity faults or have strong detection capability for errors
due to large granularity faults but very long decoding latency to correct errors due
to small granularity faults. Our proposed scheme, rate-adaptive two tiered ECC
(RATT-ECC), can correct errors due to small granularity faults with low latency and
detect errors due to large granularity faults very reliably. In addition, our scheme
allows the system to dynamically free up ECC banks as spare banks, when needed.
The low decoding latency of our scheme allows the memory system to increase the
refresh periods resulting in lower refresh power consumption without sacrificing the
reliability and timing performance.
We describe the high level overview of RATT-ECC in Section 4.1. Section 4.2
presents the detailed design of RATT-ECC. The timing performance, reliability and
the implementation overhead are analyzed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Overview Of RATT-ECC
We propose RATT-ECC, a robust and low overhead ECC scheme that can cope
with all types of faults (transient and permanent, small and large granularity faults)
as described in Section 2.2.2. Figure 4.1 shows the high level view of RATT-ECC.
RATT-ECC is also a two-tiered scheme like Citadel [27] and Efficient-RAS [28]. For
each memory read request, the corresponding tier-1 ECC parity symbols are also read
49
64 Data Symbols
512b data
ECC Die
Tier-1 Tier-2
Tier-1 Symbols
Data DataData
DataData Data
Data
Data
Memory Controller
(Tier-1 decoding)
Figure 4.1: RATT-ECC Overview
out and used to perform error correction and detection. The tier-1 code is a strong
symbol-based code which can correct all small granularity faults and detect large
granularity faults with high probability. The tier-2 code is a XOR based correction
code that is used to correct large granularity faults that cannot be corrected by the
tier-1 code. Choosing a strong code for tier-1 reduces the number of activations of
tier-2 code and also helps reduce error leaks. Furthermore, tier-1 code and tier-2
code can be modified to provide for an extra spare bank when a data bank has been
marked as faulty. In the following, we explain how RATT-ECC deals with different
types of faults.
4.1.1 Strategies For Handling 3D DRAM Faults
Transient small granularity faults : To correct errors due to transient small
granularity faults, we propose to use a stronger tier-1 code compared to Citadel [27]
and Efficient-RAS [28]. Our proposed tier-1 code can correct errors due to transient
small granularity faults without triggering tier-2 and has the same detection capability
as CRC-32 (used in [27]).
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Permanent small granularity faults : If the small granularity faults have
been marked as permanent by the MCA, we can treat the errors due to these faults as
erasures. We use erasure correction to correct errors due to permanent TSV failures.
Erasure code is a more efficient way of correcting permanent errors compared to TSV
swapping that is used in [27], and will be discussed in Section.
Transient large granularity faults : We rely on the detection of tier-1 code
and correction of tier-2 code to recover from errors due to transient large granularity
faults. Hence, the detection capability of tier-1 code should be strong to avoid error
leaks since tier-2 code only performs correction (not detection).
Permanent large granularity faults : In order to correct errors due to per-
manent large granularity faults, tier-2 code has to be activated every time. Such a
correction process incurs a large timing overhead. We propose relying on spare banks
to reduce the decoding latency. For instance, when there is a permanent bank failure,
we propose to modify tier-1 or tier-2 code so that one less bank is required to store
ECC bits and this bank can now serve as a spare bank.
4.1.2 Design Of Tier-1 And Tier-2 Codes
In order to keep the storage overhead at 12.5%, we use only one extra ECC die
to protect eight data dies. Thus, tier-1 and tier-2 parity symbols have to fit into
eight banks in the ECC die. Tier-1 code plays a more important role than tier-2
code because tier-1 code needs to have strong error detection and error correction
capabilities. If more ECC banks are allocated for tier-2 parity, errors due to large
granularity faults would be corrected faster. But this would imply use of a weaker tier-
1 code, resulting in weaker correction and detection capabilities, which is undesirable.
So we allocate at most 2 ECC banks for tier-2 parity storage.
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For tier-1 code, to achieve strong correction and detection capability, we propose
using Reed-Solomon (RS) code [5]. If we use RS (72,64) code over GF(28), the 12.5%
storage overhead budget would go towards supporting this code and there would
be no room for tier-2 parity, which is essential to recover from errors due to large
granularity faults. Therefore, RS (72,64) is not a suitable candidate. We can choose
RS (71,64) or RS (70,64) as tier-1 code since both codes can correct errors due to
small granularity faults and detect errors with very high probability (the undetected
error rate of both codes is as strong as CRC-32).
If RS (71,64) code is used, seven parity symbols need to be distributed among
seven ECC banks (one ECC bank is reserved for tier-2). The minimum number of
additional accesses with power-of-two mapping is 3 (three ECC banks store 4 + 2
+ 1 parity symbols). This assignment will hurt timing performance and so we only
consider RS (70,64) code as our tier-1 code. In this case, tier-1 parity is distributed
among six ECC banks and tier-2 parity across two ECC banks.
Finally, we choose RS code because of the embedded structure of these codes which
allows for rate adaptation – a feature that is exploited when the memory system has
faulty banks. The ECC code rate R is defined as R = k
n
, where k is the size of
information symbols and n is the size of an ECC codeword [5]. For example, the code
rate for RS (70,64) code is 64
70
.
As shown in Appendix B, RS (70,64) can be used to derive RS (69,64) and RS
(68,64) codes. The encoding of RS (68,64) code is embedded in the RS (69,64) code
and the encoding of RS (69,64) code is embedded in the RS (70,64) code. The
decoders of these three codes have a similar embedded structure. Thus the codeword
of RS (68,64) can be obtained from the codeword of RS (69,64) by removing the last
symbol, and the codeword of RS (69,64) can be obtained from the codeword of RS
(70,64) by removing the last symbol. Finally, the syndrome vector due to RS (70,64)
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Figure 4.2: Scenario 1: Flowchart For Accessing Data Cache Line, Tier-1 Code And
Tier-2 Code
can be used as the syndrome vector of RS (69,64) by removing the last symbol and
the syndrome vector due to RS (70,64) can also be used as the syndrome vector of RS
(68,64) by removing the first and the last symbols. In the next section we show how
this embedded structure can help partition the tier-1 parity symbols into two parts,
resulting in fewer memory access without affecting the reliability. Also the embedded
structure is used to implement a rate-adaptive tier-1 code that helps a provide a spare
bank when needed.
4.2 Details Of RATT-ECC
In this section we describe how RATT-ECC handles the following scenarios: (i)
no data banks are marked as faulty (Section 4.2.1), (ii) one data bank is marked as
faulty (Section 4.2.2), and (iii) two data banks are marked as faulty (Section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Scenario 1 - No Banks Are Marked As Faulty
Here, none of the data banks is marked as faulty and so all the eight ECC banks
can be used by tier-1 code and tier-2 code. Since we choose RS (70,64) code over
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GF(28) as the tier-1 code, six ECC banks are reserved for storing parity check symbols
of tier-1 code; the remaining two ECC banks are used for tier-2 code.
RS (70,64) has a minimum distance of 7 and supports the following error correction
and detection cases [5]: (i) detects six errors, (ii) corrects one error and detects
five errors, (iii) corrects two errors and detects four errors, and (iv) corrects three
errors. Table 4.1 lists the detectable and correctable error (DCE) rate, detectable
but uncorrectable error (DUE) rate and silent data corruption (SDC) rate [12,52] for
different types of failures for the four cases. We utilize the formula given in [65] to
derive the probability of undetected error or SDC rate [12] of RS (70,64) code.
Case (i) has the highest error detection probability (with SDC rate 3.6 · 10−15)
but cannot correct any errors. Once the errors are detected by tier-1 code, case (i)
relies on tier-2 code to recover from the errors. Case (ii) can correct a single error,
detect up to five errors and has 2.4 · 10−10 SDC, while case (iii) can correct double
errors, detect four errors and has a higher 7.2 · 10−6 SDC. Case (iv) can only correct
errors without detecting errors, which is a serious problem in case there are row or
bank failures. We choose case (ii) over case (iii) due to its stronger error detection
probability. Its single error correction capability can deal with errors due to small
granularity faults which account for 70% of all faults [26].
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Table 4.1: Error Handling Performance Of The Different Decoding Cases of RS (70,64)
Failure Type Case (i) Case (ii) Case (iii) Case(iv)
Detects 6 Corrects 1 error & Corrects 2 errors & Corrects 3
errors detects 5 errors detects 4 errors errors
Single bit DCE: 0% DCE: 100% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
DUE: 100% DUE: 0% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Single column DCE: 0% DCE: 100% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
DUE: 100% DUE: 0% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Single TSV DCE: 0% DCE: 100% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
DUE: 100% DUE: 0% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Double bit/ DCE: 0% DCE: 0.2% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
column/TSV DUE: 100% DUE: 99.8% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Row or Bank DCE: 0% DCE: 0% DCE: 0% DCE: 0%
DUE: 1− 3.6 · 10−15 DUE: 1− 2.4 · 10−10 DUE: 1− 7.2·−6 DUE: 0%
SDC: 3.6 · 10−15 SDC: 2.4 · 10−10 SDC: 7.2 · 10−6 SDC: 100%
During a memory read request, the 64B block is read from a data bank and its
corresponding tier-1 code is read from ECC banks in the ECC die. Since each 64B
block is encoded with six parity symbols of tier-1 code, if we put all six symbols in
a single row of an ECC bank, it incurs two disadvantages. First, it increases address
decoding complexity due to a non power-of-two computation. Also, six symbols
cannot fit perfectly if the row size is 2KB or 4KB, resulting in a need for a larger
ECC bank size. Second, if that ECC bank fails, it could lead to six symbol errors
that cannot even be detected by tier-1 code. Hence, we propose to distribute the six
symbols of tier-1 code across multiple banks to support power-of-two address mapping
and also higher reliability.
We can distribute the six symbols in one of the following way: (i) 1+1+1+1+1+1,
(ii) 2+2+2 or (iii) 4+2, all of which support power-of-two address mapping. In
distribution (i), the six symbols are stored in six ECC banks and thus six additional
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accesses are needed to retrieve tier-1 parity symbols. If a single ECC bank fails, it only
leads to one symbol error, which can be easily corrected by tier-1 code. In distribution
(ii), the six symbols are stored in three ECC banks and thus each memory request
leads to three extra accesses. If an ECC bank fails, it leads to double errors, which
can be detected by tier-1 code but require tier-2 code for correction. In distribution
(iii), the 6 symbols are stored in two different ECC banks, leading to two additional
accesses. Of the 6 symbols, 4 symbols are stored in one ECC bank and another 2
symbols are stored in the second ECC bank. Thus, if an ECC bank fails, it either
leads to four symbol errors (first bank) or double symbol errors (second bank). Both
error types can be detected by tier-1 code and corrected by tier-2 code.
We choose distribution (iii) since it requires the fewest number of access among
the three distributions. The parity symbols of tier-1 code now consist of two parts:
tier-1a (four symbols) and tier-1b (two symbols). The tier-2 code is a RAID5-like
code based on XOR operations. Since two ECC banks are reserved for storing the
parity symbols of tier-2 code, data in a set of 32 data banks are XORed and stored
in a single tier-2 bank. For example, data in banks 0 to 3 from dies 0 to 7 are XORed
and stored in one tier-2 bank, and data in banks 4 to 7 from dies 0 to 7 are XORed
and stored in the second tier-2 bank. When tier-1 code detects errors that it cannot
correct, tier-2 code is activated. To recover from errors in a 64B data block, 32 data
blocks have to be read from 32 banks.
In each memory read request, tier-1a and tier-1b parity symbols stored in two ECC
banks have to be accessed. In order to reduce the number of accesses, we propose
to read only tier-1a parity symbols. The 64B data symbols along with the 4 tier-1a
parity symbols form a codeword of RS (68,64) over GF(28). As described earlier, RS
(68,64) is obtained by puncturing RS (70,64) and so the syndrome of this code can
be used to detect errors with SDC as low as 2.3 · 10−10. If errors are detected, then
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tier-1b parity symbols are retrieved by a second access and RS (70,64) decoder is used
to correct the errors.
To reduce the timing performance overhead of these extra accesses, we use a cache
to store the ECC bits, referred to as ECC cache. Existing schemes such as [27] or [28]
also utilize ECC caches. We cache tier-1a, tier-1b and tier-2 parity symbols in the
ECC cache; however, we only check tier-1a for each memory read request. The access
flowchart is shown in Figure 4.2.
READ: A 64B block is read from one of the dies (step 1). The MC checks
whether tier-1a parity symbols are in ECC cache or not. If it is not cached, MC
reads the corresponding ECC symbols of tier-1a from the ECC bank and calculates
the syndrome corresponding to RS (68,64) code. If the syndrome vector is zero, no
additional accesses for tier-1b are required; otherwise, the ECC symbols of tier-1b
have to be accessed. If the ECC symbols of tier-1b are not cached, the MC signals an
extra read and this is shown in step 3. The parity symbols of tier-1a and tier-1b and
the 64 symbols from data cache line form a codeword of RS (70,64), which can correct
single error and detect five errors. If RS (70,64) flags a multiple error event, the MC
activates tier-2 code to correct the errors generated by large granularity faults (step
4).
WRITE: When a data cache line has to be written back to memory, the memory
controller needs to update the data cache line as well as tier-1a, tier-1b and tier-2
parity symbols. Since tier-1a, tier-1b and tier-2 parity symbols are cached, it can
reduce memory traffic contention to the ECC die. The dirty cache lines of tier-
1a, tier-1b and tier-2 codes are replaced when they are evicted. Although we have
one extra write compared to [27] and [28] for updating tier-1 parity, the extra write
operations can be well hidden and our simulation results (see Section 4.3) show that
the overhead of this extra write is quite small.
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4.2.2 Scenario 2 - 1 Data Bank Is Marked As Faulty
Once the MC marks a bank as faulty, every read access from that bank would
require activation of both tier-1 and tier-2 codes. This would result in unnecessary
performance overhead. So we propose to use a spare bank to achieve high system
reliability without degradation in timing performance.
We have two ways to free up a spare bank from the set of eight banks in the
ECC die. We can either modify the rate of tier-1 code or modify the rate of tier-2
code. (a) Modification of tier-1 code: If the tier-1 RS(70,64) code is punctured to
RS (69,64) code, five banks are needed to store the tier-1 code (instead of six banks)
and so one bank can be used as the spare bank. The tier-2 code is still stored in
two banks. Unfortunately, RS (69,64) code has weaker detection capability and thus
this modification is not our first choice. (b) Modification of tier-2 code: If only one
bank is used to store tier-2 code, then the second bank can be used as the spare;
the tier-1 code is still stored in 6 banks. Here data from all 64 banks (instead of 32
banks) have to be XORed and stored in one XCC bank. Since tier-2 code data was
previously stored in 2 XCC banks, data in the two XCC banks has to be XORed
and stored in one XCC bank. Thus the modification of tier-2 only changes the error
correction latency for large granularity faults and so we choose modification (b) over
modification (a). Thus in Scenario 2, we still use RS (70,64) code as the tier-1 code.
Six ECC banks are still used to store the tier-1 code, one ECC bank is used to store
tier-2 code and one ECC bank is utilized as a spare bank.
READ: The sequence of operations is essentially the same as Scenario 1. However,
to recover from errors in a block, row or bank failures, 64 blocks, rows or banks have
to be accessed instead of 32 in Scenario 1.
WRITE: The write-back operation is the same as Scenario 1.
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4.2.3 Scenario 3 - 2 Banks Are Marked As Faulty
If there are two bank failures, we use RS (69,64) code which is obtained by punc-
turing RS (70,64) code to free up the second spare bank. We choose to perform single
error correction and quadruple error detection with 5.9 · 10−8 SDC as the decoding
strategy. Although RS (69,64) code can also be used to support double error detec-
tion and triple error detection, the corresponding SDC drops to 1.26× 10−4, which is
too low for a reliable tier-1 code.
The five parity symbols due to RS (69,64) code cannot be stored in the same ECC
bank due to poor storage efficiency. Also, if we store five ECC symbols in the same
ECC bank, a single row or bank failure of an ECC bank can lead to five errors and
this cannot be detected and corrected by tier-1 code. Hence, we distribute five ECC
parity symbols across two ECC banks (four symbols in one ECC bank and the fifth
symbol in another ECC bank). This distribution has two advantages: first, tier-1a
parity of RS (69,64) is the same as that of RS (70,64). Thus, there is no change in the
storage pattern of tier-1a across all three scenarios. Second, the tier-1a continues to
have high detection probability. In this scenario, the tier-1b parity symbols need to
be mapped from two ECC banks to only one ECC bank; the corresponding overhead
is described in Section 4.3.3.
READ: When a 64B block is read from one of the dies, the MC checks whether
tier-1a parity symbols are in ECC cache and then sends the 64 + 4 symbols to RS
(68,64) unit. If the syndrome vector is not zero, MC reads one tier-1b parity symbol
to form the RS (69,64) code. If RS (69,64) decoder flags a multiple error event, MC
activates tier-2 code to correct the errors generated by large granularity faults.
WRITE: The write-back operation is the same as Scenarios 1 and 2.
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Figure 4.4: Decoding Flowchart Of Erasure And Error Correction Mode Of RS (70,64)
Code For Handling Errors Due To A Permanent TSV Failure
4.2.4 Correction Of Errors Due To Permanent TSV Failure
In the organization described in Figure 2.4, a single TSV failure only leads to
one symbol error, which can easily be corrected by only tier-1 code. However, both
tier-1a and tier-1b parity symbols are needed to perform correction and in the worst
case, this leads to two additional memory accesses. Now if the TSV failure is marked
as permanent by the MCA, the corresponding symbol can be treated as erasure and
the erasure and error correction [5] capability of this code can be used to correct the
error. Figure 4.4 gives the decoding flow chart for this case. First, 64 symbols from
the data bank and 4 tier-1a parity symbols are read and sent to the RS (68,64) unit
(which is embedded in the RS (70,64) unit). The RS (68,64) unit checks whether it
is a single erasure event. If it is a single erasure event, the decoder directly corrects
it; otherwise, it declares that there are errors (this code can detect up to three extra
errors with SDC rate of 5.9 · 10−8).
Apart from a faulty TSV (that has been marked by the MCA), if there is one more
random error, RS (68,64) can detect it. The two tier-1b symbols are then read and
sent to the RS (70,64) which now performs single error and single erasure correction,
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Table 4.2: Simulation Configuration
Processors
Core 4 cores, 3.2 GHz out-of-order, 128 ROB
L1 I-cache 4-way, 32KB, 1 cycle; 64B cache line
L1 D-cache 4-way, 32KB, 2 cycle; 64B cache line
L2 cache 8-way, 256KB, 4 cycle; 64B cache line
L3 cache 16-way, shared 4MB, 24 cycles; 64B cache line
3D Stacked DRAM
Size 8GB, 8 data layers
Bus Frequency 800MHz (DDR3 1.6GHz), 128b per channel
Channels 8 channels per stack
Memory Controller 1 memory controller per channel
Banks 8 banks per channel
Data block size 64B
Scheduling Policy FR-FCFS
Row Buffer 2KB
tRAS-tCAS-tRP 27-9-9
or single erasure and four error detection (with SDC rate of 5.9 · 10−8). Hence, the
decoder can correct an error caused by a transient fault and an error caused by a
permanent TSV fault without activating the tier-2 code. The synthesis results for
these units are given in Table 4.8.
4.3 Evaluation
We analyze the timing performance of our proposed scheme with ECC cache
implementation in Section 4.3.1, the reliability in Section 4.3.2 and hardware overhead
in Section 4.3.3.
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4.3.1 Timing Performance Analysis
Simulation Infrastructure & Workloads
To evaluate the performance of our proposed ECC scheme, we utilize macsim [66],
a cycle-level x86 simulator. We model a quad-core processor, where each core has a
private 32KB(I) cache + a 32KB(D) L1 cache and a unified 256KB L2 cache. The
size of the shared L3 cache is 4MB. The memory system uses 3D-stacked DRAM with
8 data dies (1GB per die). The detailed configuration of our system is described in
Table 4.2.
We use 17 SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and simulate a representative set of 250M
instructions identified with SimPoint [62]. We categorize the applications into four
different groups based on the misses per thousand instructions (MPKI) in the L3
cache. We simulate 4 high memory intensity workloads (MPKI is above 27), 2 high-
median intensity workloads (MPKI is between 15 and 27), 4 median intensity work-
loads (MPKI is between 1 and 15) and 7 low workloads (MPKI is below 1). Table
4.3 summarizes the workload combinations.
ECC Cache Implementation
The proposed ECC cache stores tier-1a, tier-1b, and tier-2 parity symbols. We allocate
50% of the ECC cache to tier-1a, 25% to tier-1b and 25% to tier-2. This distribution
is motivated by the fact that in the ECC die, four banks are used to store tier-1a
parity symbols, two banks are used to store tier-1b parity symbols and another two
banks are used to store tier-2 parity symbols. The ECC cache is housed in the logic
die. It is implemented as a directed mapped cache with size varying from 256KB to
2MB.
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Table 4.3: Workloads
Mix Workload MPKI Group
WL-1 4 x astar 13.99 M
WL-2 4 x bwaves 30.8 H
WL-3 4 x bzip2 2.28 M
WL-4 4 x dealII 0.77 L
WL-5 4 x gromacs 0.71 L
WL-6 4 x h264ref 1.33 M
WL-7 4 x lbm 45.53 H
WL-8 4 x libquantum 24.97 HM
WL-9 4 x mcf 88.46 H
WL-10 4 x namd 0.1 L
WL-11 4 x omnetpp 23.95 HM
WL-12 4 x perlbench 0.06 L
WL-13 4 x povray 0.02 L
WL-14 4 x sjeng 0.34 L
WL-15 4 x soplex 29.78 H
WL-16 4 x tonto 0.02 L
WL-17 4 x zeusmp 6.42 M
Table 4.4: The Coverage Of Tier-1a, Tier-1b And Tier-2 Parity For Three Scenarios.
Each Block Is Of Size 64B.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
tier-1a Covers 16 blocks Covers 16 blocks Covers 16 blocks
tier-1b Covers 32 blocks Covers 32 blocks Covers 64 blocks
tier-2 Covers 32 blocks Covers 64 blocks Covers 64 blocks
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Table 4.5: Comparison Of The Error Handling Performance Of Tier-1 Codes Used In
The Existing Schemes
Error Type CRC-32 4 x Rotational code 1 x RS (69,64) 1 x RS (70,64)
Detect errors Corrects 1 error & Corrects 1 error & Corrects 1 error &
detects 2 errors detects 4 errors detects 5 errors
Single bit failure DCE: 0% DCE: 100% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
DUE: 100% DUE: 0% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Single column failure DCE: 0% DCE: 100% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
DUE: 100% DUE: 0% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Single TSV failure DCE: 0% DCE: 100% DCE: 100% DCE: 100%
DUE: 100% DUE: 0% DUE: 0% DUE: 0%
SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0% SDC: 0%
Row or Bank failure DCE: 0% DCE: 0 DCE: 0% DCE: 0%
DUE: 1 - 2.3 · 10−10 DUE: 97% DUE: 1− 5.9 · 10−8 DUE: 1 - 2.4 · 10−10
SDC: 2.3 · 10−10 SDC: 3% SDC: 5.9 · 10−8 SDC: 2.4 · 10−10
Table 4.6: FIT Analysis
Resultant FIT
Failure Mode Raw FIT Citadel [27] Efficient-RAS [28] RATT-ECC Scenario 1 and 2 RATT-ECC Scenario 3
Single bit 320 0* 0 0 0
Single column 70 0* 0 0 0
Single row 80 1.8 · 10−8* 2.4* 1.9 · 10−8* 4.7 · 10−6*
Single bank 100 2.3 · 10−8* 3* 2.4 · 10−8* 5.9 · 10−6*
Single TSV 41 0* 0 0 0
Summary 611 4.1 · 10−8 5.4 4.3 · 10−8 1.1 · 10−5
* means the correction should be performed by tier-2
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In an error-free system, for each memory read request, the MC checks whether the
corresponding parity symbols of tier-1a are cached or not. If it is not cached, a read
request is launched by MC to retrieve the data from the ECC banks of tier-1a. For
each write-back request, MC has to update the data, tier-1a, tier-1b and tier-2 parity
symbols. The MC checks whether the parity symbols of tier-1a, tier-1b or tier-2 are
cached or not. If these parity symbols are not cached, MC launches the requests to
the ECC die.
Timing Performance Of RATT-ECC
We assume that the system is error-free. Also, we only simulate for Scenario 1 since
this is projected to have the worst timing performance. The ECC cache entry size is
also set to 64B, which is consistent with the rest of the memory system. Figure 4.5
gives the hit rate for different ECC cache sizes. When ECC cache size is larger than
1MB, the hit rate becomes stable at 70%. Figure 4.6 compares the execution time for
different ECC cache sizes; the execution time is normalized to the baseline that does
not have any ECC scheme. These results show that for ECC cache sizes which are
less than 512KB, the execution time is increased by 5%, which is too large. However,
if we use ECC cache sizes of 1MB or 2MB, the execution time increases by 2.4% and
1.8% respectively, which is acceptable.
Although we did not perform the simulations for Scenarios 2 and 3, we argue that
Scenario 1 captures the worst case timing performance. In Scenario 1, a cache line of
tier-1a part of the ECC cache covers 16 blocks of one data bank, a cache line in the
tier-1b part covers 32 blocks of one data bank and a cache line in the tier-2 part ECC
cache covers 32 data blocks across 32 banks. In Scenario 2, tier-2 part of the ECC
cache covers 64 blocks across 64 banks. Thus the hit rate of the ECC cache will be
higher in Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 1. Similarly, in Scenario 3, the tier-1b part
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Figure 4.6: Normalized Execution Time For Different ECC Cache Sizes
of the ECC cache covers 64 blocks of a data bank (instead of 32 blocks in Scenario
1) and the hit rate of the ECC cache will be higher. Hence, Scenario 1 will have the
worst timing performance followed by Scenario 2 and then Scenario 3.
Refresh Power Evaluation
Current 3D DRAM memories, such as HBM, are 8GB and are projected to become
larger in the near future [7]. As the 3D DRAM size increases, the refresh power
accounts for a larger part of the DRAM power. In order to reduce the refresh power,
we increase the refresh interval and correct the errors caused by the larger interval
to maintain the same reliability level as the baseline (64ms). In our simulation, we
utilize the error rates due to increase in refresh interval from [67]. Table 4.7 shows the
significant increase in the number of single bit errors (retention failures) as the refresh
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Table 4.7: Number Of DRAM Cell Retention Errors As A Function Of Refresh In-
terval In A 60nm Process; The Default Refresh Interval Is 64ms.
Memory size
Refresh interval 8GB 16GB 32GB 64GB
128ms 8 15 30 60
256ms 250 500 1000 2000
interval increases for different memory sizes. According to [67], weak cells caused by
increasing the refresh interval are randomly distributed throughout the DRAM array.
Hence, for each memory read access, there is at most one bit error (among 512 bits),
and this error can be corrected by tier-1 code with low decoding latency.
The default refresh rate is set to 64ms (as DDR3), which corresponds to the error
free case, and so we normalize all the results to this case. For 8GB DRAM, if we
increase the refresh interval to 128ms, there would be 8 additional errors as indicated
in Table 4.7. We inject errors in 8 random locations in the memory trace of each
benchmark corresponding to the worst case consideration. Similarly, if the refresh
interval is 256ms, we inject 250 errors in random locations in the memory trace. We
run the simulations 100 times and take the average for each benchmark. The number
of additional error corrections for each benchmark is shown in Figure 4.7.
When the memory read access contains data from the leaky cell (single bit error),
the memory controller activates the correction operation to correct this error. RATT-
ECC relies on tier-1 code to correct this error and the overhead is quite small. The
overhead is due to the tier-1 ECC cache miss which has a penalty of 100ns to read
data. The syndrome calculation and single error correction takes only 0.52ns and
0.47ns (from Table 4.8), respectively.
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Figure 4.8 shows the power reduction of RATT-ECC scheme for refresh intervals
of 128ms and 256ms compared to when the refresh interval is 64ms. While the refresh
power reduces by 50% when the refresh interval is increased to 128ms and by 75%
when the refresh interval is increased to 256ms, the overall power reduction is a
lot lower. For instance, the power consumption is reduced by an average of 4.1%
(maximum: 7.1% and minimum: 2%) and 7.1% (maximum: 11.2% and minimum:
3.2%) when the refresh interval is 128ms and 256ms, respectively.
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Figure 4.7: Number Of Additional Error Corrections For 8GB DRAM When The
Refresh Interval Is Increased.
We also increase the DRAM memory size from 8GB to 64GB and change the cor-
responding DRAM parameters in the power consumption simulation of DRAMSim2.
The result is shown in Figure 4.9. For memory size of 16GB, 32GB and 64GB, the
power consumption reduces by an average of 11.9%, 14.6% and 16.3% if the refresh
interval is 128ms, and reduces by an average of 15.1%, 17.6% and 21.6%, if the refresh
interval is 256ms. Thus for large memory size, the total power consumption reduces
significantly and since all additional single bit errors are corrected by tier-1, this is
achieved with negligible loss in timing performance.
Finally, we also compare the timing and power performance of RATT-ECC to
E-RAS [28], Citadel and [27] for larger refresh intervals. When the refresh interval is
increased, RATT-ECC and E-RAS have very little overhead in timing performance,
since they can all correct the additional single bit errors using the tier-1 code. How-
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Figure 4.9: Power Reduction Of 8GB To 64GB Memory For Different Refresh Inter-
vals
ever, Citadel takes 0.7s to correct every single bit error, which increases its total
execution time and power consumption significantly.
4.3.2 Reliability Comparison
In this section, we compare the reliability of RATT-ECC with respect to the ex-
isting methods, namely, Citadel [27] and Efficient-RAS [28]. For tier-1 code, [27]
uses CRC-32 to detect errors and there exists a shortened CRC-32 code with data
length 512 bits that achieves that the upper bound (2−32) of undetected error prob-
ability. CRC-32 code can detect all errors due to the small granularity faults and
can detect the errors caused by the large granularity faults with SDC smaller than
2−32 ≈ 2.3 · 10−10.
The scheme is [28] uses a symbol-based code (rotational code in [12]) to correct
errors due to small granularity faults and detect errors due to large granularity faults
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which are then corrected by XCC. The symbol-based code uses four bits/symbol and
can perform single symbol correction and double symbol detection (SSC-DSD). Since
there is no theoretical bound for undetected error probability for this code, we did
Monte Carlo simulations to derive the corresponding SDC rate for large granularity
faults. The number of trials is more than 10M. We assumed that each bit in a single
cache line has 0.5 probability to be flipped. We found that its SDC rate is around
3%, which is too high for a reliable tier-1 code.
CRC-32 has good detection capability but cannot correct any errors while rota-
tional code has good correction capability but poor SDC. RS (70,64) that is used in
Scenarios 1 and 2 has strong correction and detection capabilities. Although we only
read the first 4 symbols for detection, the corresponding RS (68,64) code still has a
very low SDC of 2.3 · 10−10. Once RS (68,64) code detects errors, other two ECC
symbols are read and RS (70,64) decoder is activated. It corrects all errors caused
by the small granularity faults and detects errors caused by large granularity faults
with 2.4 · 10−10 SDC. RS (69,64) code, which is used in Scenario 3, can correct one
symbol error and detect four symbol errors and has slightly higher SDC (5.9 · 10−8).
We summarize the DCE, DUE and SDC rates of the CRC-32 code (used by [27]),
rotational code (used by [28]), RS (70,64) (RATT-ECC Scenario 1 and 3) and RS
(69,64) (RATT-ECC Scenario 3) in Table 4.5.
Transient small granularity faults : All three schemes can correct errors due
to transient small granularity faults. Since [27] uses tier-2 code to correct these errors,
it has a higher performance overhead.
Permanent small granularity faults: Here, we only discuss errors due to
permanent TSV failures. Such failures are handled using spare TSV in [27]. The
method in [28] can directly correct the errors due to a single TSV failure, however,
it suggests using spare TSV to avoid correction overhead. In our scheme, we use
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erasure correction capability of the RS code to directly correct these errors by only
using tier-1a. The latency of correction is quite small (0.33ns) since correcting an
erasure is much easier and faster than correcting an error (in Table 4.8).
Transient large granularity faults: All schemes rely on tier-1 code to detect
the errors caused by large granularity faults and launch tier-2 for correction. [28] has
significantly higher SDC rate, making it less reliable compared to the others.
Permanent large granularity faults: Large granularity faults tend to have a
bimodal distribution [27]. There are either a few row failures (less than four rows) or
a large number of row failures (more than 4K rows) in a single bank. To handle the
case when there are a few row failures in a single bank, we also allocate some extra
spare rows per bank in the logic die, similar to [27] and [28].
When multiple rows develop faults, the bank is marked as a faulty bank by MCA.
To handle errors due to faulty banks, [27] allocates two spare banks. [28] considers
permanent TSV or row failures but not permanent bank failures. However, permanent
bank failures cannot be neglected and spare banks are the most efficient way to avoid
the burden of error correction. RATT-ECC adjusts the rates of tier-1 and tier-2 code
to free up ECC banks to be used as spare banks.
FIT Analysis: Real-world field data from [4] provides DRAM FIT rate for 1Gb
2D DRAM device. Since field data are not available for 3D DRAM, we used the
numbers from [28], which conservatively projects that 3D DRAM has 10x higher
error rates than 2D DRAM. We simply borrowed the raw FIT values from [28] and
used them to compute the final FIT rates.
Table 4.6 presents the final FIT rate of the competing schemes. All schemes can
completely remove the errors due to small granularity faults. RATT-ECC (Scenario
1 and 2) and [27] can reduce the raw FIT rates to around 4 · 10−8, which improves
more than 109x compared to the baseline (no ECC) scheme. RATT-ECC Scenario 3
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also reduces the total raw FIT rate to 1.1 · 10−5. However, due to the poor detection
capability of rotational code, [28] only decreases the overall raw FIT rate to 5.4.
4.3.3 Hardware Overhead Of RATT-ECC
The overhead of RATT-ECC scheme consists of ECC decoding units, ECC cache
and the modification required to support rate-adaptive codes.
ECC Decoding Units: We synthesized the syndrome calculation and the error
correction units for rotational code [12] and RS (70,64) code using 28nm industry
library. Syndrome and error correction units for RS (69,64) and RS (68,64) have not
be designed separately. Instead, the RS (70,64) units are used and small additional
logic is used to support the punctured codes (RS (69,64) and RS (68,64)). Table
4.8 gives the area, latency and power information for rotational code and RS (70,64).
Since syndrome calculation is on the critical path of memory read, its decoding latency
is made as small as possible. The decoding latency of syndrome calculation for a
single rotational code is 0.41ns; since 4 rotational codes are used per channel, the
area increases to 8000 um2. The decoding latency of syndrome calculation of RS
(70,64) code is slightly higher at 0.52ns and its area is 11,337 um2.
Considering an average latency of a memory read is around 30ns-40ns [24] and
the lower clock frequency of L3 cache (1ns), the latency of syndrome calculation of
RS (70,64) code incurs only one extra cycle in L3 cache or DRAM cycle. Since the
logic die area of the existing computer system is around 200-500 mm2, the size of the
ECC unit consumes a negligible extra area in the logic die.
Rate-Adaptive Code Implementation : The 64 data symbols and 4 symbols
of the tier-1a code are decoded using the RS (68,64) decoder, which is embedded in
the RS (70,64) decoder. If an error is detected, 2 additional symbols are read and
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Table 4.8: Synthesis Results Of Existing ECC Schemes
Area Latency Power
Rotational code 2,000um2 0.41ns 0.0083 mW (Static)
Syndrome Calculation 14.5 mW (Dynamic)
Rotational code 2,760um2 0.41ns 0.0015 mW (Static)
SSC-DSD 12.5 mW (Dynamic)
RS(70,64) 11,337um2 0.52ns 0.0645 mW (Static)
Syndrome Calculation 36.345 mW (Dynamic)
RS(70,64) 2,024um2 0.47ns 0.0195 mW (Static)
Single Error Correction 22.53 mW (Dynamic)
RS(70,64) 1,336um2 0.33ns 0.0144 mW (Static)
Single Erasure Correction 25.62 mW (Dynamic)
RS(70,64) 5,658um2 1.01ns 0.0271 mW (Static)
Single Erasure & Single 21.44 mW (Dynamic)
Error Correction
sent to the RS (70,64) decoder. Our hardware implementation has only one main RS
(70,64) decoder and a small control unit to support the other two decoders.
In Scenarios 2 and 3, data in two ECC banks of tier-2 (from Scenario 1) are XORed
and stored in one ECC bank in Scenarios 2 and 3. This step can be pipelined with
the storage of new data in the spare bank. However, when we move from RS (70,64)
to RS (69,64) to free up a bank, only one of the two tier-1b parity symbols from
RS (70,64) have to be stored. Reorganizing the data in the new tier-1b ECC bank
may take time and so we propose to use tier-1a code for detection and tier-2 code for
correction during that time. While activating tier-2 for small granularity faults has a
performance overhead, the reliability of our ECC scheme is not compromised.
ECC cache: We consider direct mapped ECC cache with sizes ranging from
256KB to 2MB. The ECC cache size could be reduced if the cache supported set
associativity.
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4.4 Summary
We presented a two-tiered ECC scheme, RATT-ECC, where the first tier is used
to handle errors due to small granularity faults (single bit, column and TSV) and
the second-tier is used to handle errors due to large granularity faults (row or bank
failures). We chose a strong symbol based RS code in tier-1, namely, RS (70,64) code
because of its ability to correct errors due to small granularity faults and reliably
detect errors due to large granularity faults. This code can also be punctured and
the resulting RS (69,64) and RS (68,64) codes share the same encoder and decoder as
the RS (70,64) code. The punctured codes can also be used to free up a ECC bank
if a data bank is faulty or help store and decode tier-1 parity symbols in a way that
reduces the number of memory accesses. The tier-2 code is an XCC based code which
can also be modified to free up a ECC bank. The simulation results with SPEC2006
benchmarks show that the average performance overhead is less than 2%. Due to the
strong error correction capability and low latency of decoding, RATT-ECC can be
used to reduce the refresh power without sacrificing reliability and performance.
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Chapter 5
3D DRAM ECC SCHEMES FOR GPU
In this chapter, we propose Config-ECC, a configurable ECC scheme for HBM
systems that service GPUs. The ECC design for a GPU system is more challenging
than the ECC design for a CPU system. Most CPU systems have fixed cache line size
of 64B while the cache line size in today’s commercial GPU products have cache line
sizes ranging from 32B to 128B. Some GPUs allow the cache line size to be configured
before the application starts while others allow change in the configuration at runtime
to achieve even better performance. A fixed ECC scheme cannot be used for the
varied sized accesses from GPU applications due to the mismatch of the GPU request
and the fixed ECC scheme. This results in either lower reliability or higher energy
consumption. Hence, we propose a configurable ECC scheme to tackle this mismatch
problem.
Section 5.1 gives the motivation for this work. Section 5.2 gives the high level
overview of our proposed Config-ECC and Section 5.3 presents the detailed design
for 32B access. The 32B access scheme can be extended to support different sized
accesses as explained in Section 5.4. The reliability and simulation infrastructure are
given in Section 5.5 and the results are shown in Section 5.6.
5.1 Motivation For An ECC Design Supporting GPU’s Varying Data Fetch Sizes
The cache line size in today’s commercial GPU products is not fixed at 64B as in
most CPU systems. For example, the cache line size of NVIDIA Fermi GPUs [68] is
128B, the cache line size of Intel Gen9 GPUs and AMD Graphics [36,69] is 64B, and
the data fetch granularity of NVIDIA Maxwell GPUs [70] is 32B with two different
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L2 cache line sizes of 32B and 128B. Different applications favor different cache line
sizes and we anticipate that GPU configurations with multiple cache line sizes will
be used in future data centers.
Consider the device driver of NVIDIA Tesla GPU which can be modified to launch
kernels with two cache configurations before the start of an application. When the
L1 cache is turned on, the L1 as well as for the L2 cache lines are 128B. When the
L1 cache is turned off, the data fetch size of the L2 cache becomes finer-grained 32B.
Figure 5.1 shows the performance characterization results for GPGPU applications
running with different cache configurations on a Nvidia Kepler-based GPU. The blue
bars represent the performance of our baseline system with the L1 cache enabled,
as such, the L2 cache operates at the 128B data fetch granularity whereas the black
bars represent the performance speedup when the L1 cache is disabled, resulting a
finer-grained 32B data fetch size. Applications in the first category prefer a finer
data fetch granularity (32B) while other applications prefer a coarse-grained data
fetch size (128B) because of the relative well-exploited spatial locality. Choosing
the right configuration results in not only better performance but also lower energy
consumption.
Also, within a GPU kernel, optimal data fetch granularities can vary as well. A
strong correlation between an issuing instruction, its degree of memory divergence and
the optimal data fetch size was demonstrated in [38]. Also [39] showed that a dynamic
data fetch granularity design can significantly improve the performance and energy
efficiency of GPUs. Our own characterization study (Figure 5.2) illustrates a similar
trend for a large set of GPGPU applications and each color of the bars indicates the
portion of the 128B cache line before its eviction. We can observe that, within an
application, the data access pattern can be mixed, demanding varying size of data.
Since the optimal data access granularity changes during the kernel execution at
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runtime, an optimized GPU design needs to be able to predict and apply the optimal
memory configuration to improve resource utilization and performance of the GPGPU
application.
Traditional DRAM ECC algorithms are developed and optimized for fixed sized
data accesses. Applying an ECC algorithm that is optimized for a certain data
fetch size causes configuration mismatch with GPU cache line size, that leads to
sub-optimal reliability and larger energy consumption. Here, we use Figure 5.3 to
explain the mismatch. An ECC scheme optimized for 32B data access (Figure 5.3(a))
can support 32B, 64B and 128B accesses without additional energy consumption.
77
Fixed
32B
ECC
Scheme
GPU 
32B request
Match
64B request  
low reliability
128B request 
low reliability
Fixed
64B
ECC
Scheme
32B request
high energy
64B request  
Match
128B request 
low reliability
Fixed
128B
ECC
Scheme
32B request
high energy
64B request  
high energy
128B request 
Match
GPU GPU
(a) Fixed 32B ECC Scheme (b) Fixed 64B ECC Scheme (c) Fixed 64B ECC Scheme
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However, since 64B and 128B requests are processed by a 32B ECC scheme, the
reliability is lower than if they were processed by a 64B or 128B fixed ECC scheme. An
ECC scheme designed for 64B data access (Figure 5.3(b)) can support 64B and 128B
accesses without additional energy overhead but the 128B request has lower reliability
compared to if it were processed by an fixed 128B ECC scheme. For 64B ECC scheme,
32B request leads to 64B access from HBM, resulting in an additional 32B read and
consuming more energy. Although 64B ECC scheme provides stronger reliability
compared to a 32B ECC scheme, it forces the system to read 64B, resulting in higher
energy. Similarly, an ECC scheme designed for 128B data access (Figure 5.3(c)) can
support 128B requests without additional energy consumption but a 32B or a 64B
request forces it to always read 128B data. This overfetch consumes significantly
more energy. Thus these are mismatches between GPU data fetch sizes and ECC
algorithms, referred to as configuration mismatches.
To address the issues due to configuration mismatch, we propose Config-ECC,
a mechanism to provide a strong reliability guarantee while minimizing data fetch
energy consumption for the GPU memory subsystem for a varying granularity of
data accesses. The proposed Config-ECC provides two operation modes:
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• Static Operation Mode which tackles the mismatch issue by providing ECC
protection for small or large data access granularity at the application level.
• Dynamic Operation Mode which tackles the mismatch issue by interleaving
small and large sized ECC protection for supporting mixed locality behavior
during runtime.
5.2 Overview Of Config-ECC
Config-ECC operates in two modes: the dynamic mode configuration is shown in
Figure 5.4 and the static mode configuration is shown in Figure 5.5.
In the dynamic mode (see Figure 5.4), for 32B accesses, we only use the inner code
to protect 32B of data and use the outer code to correct errors when the inner code
detects errors. For 64B accesses, both inner code and outer code are used, resulting in
better reliability compared to the 32B accesses. For 128B accesses, two separate 64B
decoding units are used resulting in the same protection capability as 64B accesses.
In the static mode (see Figure 5.5), we add interleavers to increase the burst error
detection capability. Recall that large granularity faults manifest as burst errors and
adding interleavers is a low cost method of improving burst error detection capability.
For 64B accesses, an interleaving unit is used to spread the erroneous bits in two
256b of data to two inner code decoding units. Similarly, for 128B accesses, the
interleaving unit is used to spread the erroneous bits of four 256b of data to four
inner code decoding units.
5.2.1 Design Of Tier-1 Code
In our system, the tier-1 code has the following requirements. First, it should
have strong detection capability for different types of accesses. Specifically, it should
detect all errors due to small granularity faults and have very low SDC rates for errors
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due to large granularity faults. This feature is very important since the tier-2 code is
only activated when the tier-1 code detects errors. Thus, the tier-1 code has to offer
a strong detection capability.
Second, the tier-1 code should correct all errors due to small granularity faults.
Recent work on DRAM reliability indicates that errors due to small granularity faults
account for more than 70% of the total faults [4,25]. Since the tier-2 code has larger
latency and consumes more energy to correct errors, errors due to small granularity
faults should be corrected by the tier-1 code. Third, the storage overhead of the tier-1
code should be constrained to 12.5%, as indicated in the HBM standard [33].
Since the ECC storage overhead is 12.5% for the tier-1 code design, each 32B
(=256 bits) of data is protected by 32 ECC bits. These 32 ECC bits are stored along
with the data in the same bank. Of these 32 bits, N parity bits are reserved for the
inner code and the remaining (32−N) bits are reserved for the outer code. The choice
of whether more bits should be allotted to inner code or outer code is dictated by the
following consideration. If we put more bits in the inner code, it would have strong
detection capability but the outer code might not be able to support correction. On
the other hand, if we put more bits in the outer code, the inner code might have
weak detection capability for errors due to large granularity faults and might lead to
miss-error events. So we choose to allot more ECC bits to the inner code to support
strong detection capability.
Inner Code: For each set of 32 ECC bits, the N parity bits can be designed to
support correction or detection of 32B data. If the inner code is designed to provide
for both correction and detection, its overall detection strength would be lower. Note
that a linear block code with minimum distance, dmin, can be designed to perform
(i) correction only (corrects up to bdmin
2
c errors), (ii) detection only (detects up to
dmin - 1 errors) or (iii) detection and correction (corrects λ errors and detects l errors
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where λ + l + 1 ≤ dmin and λ < l) [5]. Here we choose to use the N parity bits
for only detection, so that the tier-1 inner code has strong detection capabilities.
Designing the inner code for strong detection guarantees that errors due to small
and large granularity faults be detected, producing very low SDC rates. If the inner
code detects errors, the tier-1 outer code can be used to correct errors due to small
granularity faults and the tier-2 code can be used to recover errors due to large
granularity faults.
Outer Code: Of the 32 ECC bits, if N bits are allotted for tier-1 inner code,
we only have 32 − N bits for the outer code. If N is (say) 24, there are not enough
bits to design an outer code with the desired detection and correction capabilities. So
we combine ECC bits associated with two sets of 32B data. Specifically, we combine
2× (32−N) ECC bits to form the parity bits of the outer code.
The proposed outer code corrects all errors due to small granularity faults such as
single bit, single column and single TSV faults. Single bit and single column failures
lead to 1 bit error in a 32B access. On the other hand, a single TSV failure could lead
to 4 bit errors in a 32B access. So, if bit-level correction code is used for the outer
code, it would need to have the ability to correct 4 bit errors. However, if we align
the TSV bits in a symbol (ex. 8 bits per symbol), a TSV failure would only lead to
one symbol error in a codeword and a single symbol error correction code could be
used to correct these errors. Therefore, we choose symbol based code as the outer
code to handle correction of errors due to single bit, single column and single TSV
failures.
5.2.2 Tier-2 Code
Once the errors in the data line are flagged as errors due to large granularity
faults (that cannot be corrected by the tier-1 code), the tier-2 code is invoked. The
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tier-2 code corrects errors due to large granularity faults caused by a single row/bank
failure in a die-stacked DRAM. The tier-2 code is based on an XOR-correction code
as used in [27,28,31,32]. Specifically, 126 data lines and 1 parity line in the same row
location in other data banks are read out and XORed to generate the correct data
line. The tier-2 code has an additional storage overhead of 1/127.
Since the tier-1 code can correct errors due to small granularity faults, a simple
XOR-correction code is efficient for correcting errors due to large granularity faults
such as a single row or single bank failure. To handle errors due to multiple row
or bank failures, Config-ECC can be extended to support the 3 dimensional parity
scheme in [27] or helix-parity storage scheme in [31].
5.3 Details Of 32B Config-ECC
This section describes the detailed design of our ECC scheme for fixed 32B data
fetch size HBMs. We first describe the design of the inner code in Section 5.3.1 and
the design of the outer code in Section 5.3.2. Section 5.3.3 summarizes the error
detection and correction operations and the decoding flowcharts for 32B accesses.
5.3.1 Design Of the Tier-1 Inner Code
For a strong error detection capability, Reed-Solomon (RS) [65] symbol based code
or cyclic redundancy code (CRC) [71] are both good candidates for the tier-1 code.
Both RS and CRC codes can provide strong detection capability for burst errors as
well as multiple random bit errors (large granularity faults). However, these two codes
have different detection capabilities.
Consider two candidate ECC codes that use 24b ECC to protect 256b data,
namely, RS (35,32) code in GF(28) and CRC-24. RS (35,32) can detect three symbol
errors within 35 symbols (8 bits per symbol). However, it cannot guarantee detection
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of all 24-bits consecutive bit errors in a 280 bit (35× 8) codeword. For example, if 24
consecutive bit errors fall into four consecutive symbols in the RS (35,32) codeword,
the RS code cannot fully detect four symbol errors. It can detect up to 17 burst
errors.
On the other hand, CRC-24 can detect any 24 consecutive bit errors in the 280
bit codeword. CRC-24 has minimum distance of 6 [72] and so it can detect up to 5
random bit errors. Five random bit errors could lead up to 5 random symbol errors
that the RS code cannot detect and thus CRC-24 has stronger detection capability
for this error event. When the number of errors is larger than what the CRC-24 or RS
(35,32) code can detect, their theoretical silent data corruption rate approaches 2−24
as indicated in [73]. Furthermore, CRC provides more flexibility than a RS-based
code. For instance, since the data size is 256b,a RS-based code has to be designed
over finite field GF(28) or larger, resulting in large hardware overhead. In contrast,
there is a large set of CRC codes that are available in [74] and so for a fixed data
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size and storage overhead, a CRC code with the appropriate protection level can be
chosen more easily.
Therefore, for the tier-1 inner code, we choose to use the CRC-24 code to perform
detection. We select the CRC polynomials for CRC-24 from [72, 74]. We choose the
CRC polynomial 0xBD80DE, which has the largest minimum distance of 6 among
all CRC-24 codes and also detects all odd number of errors. The largest minimum
distance guarantees the strongest detection capability for random bit errors.
5.3.2 Design Of Tier-1 Outer Code
The outer code is designed to perform correction using a symbol-based code, as
outlined in Section 5.2. For low storage overhead with strong correction capability,
we propose to use a RS-based code to perform correction and detection as the tier-1
outer code.
Since there are 32 ECC bits to protect each group of 32B data and the inner code
is CRC-24, then there are only 32 − 24 = 8 bits to design the outer code, which
is not enough even to correct a single bit error. For instance, (265,256) shortened
Hamming code from (511,502) Hamming code needs 9 parity bits to perform the
single bit error correction. So as mentioned in Section 5.2.1, we combine the parity
bits of two 32B accesses to form the parity bits of the outer code. Thus, we now have
2× (32− 24) = 16 bits for the outer code. The errors due to small granularity faults
might occur in the data bits as well as the CRC parity bits, so the outer code protects
both data bits and CRC parity bits. We choose the RS (72,70) code over finite field
GF(28) as the outer code. RS (72,70) can be used to provide single error correction
because its minimum distance is 3 [5].
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5.3.3 Error Correction & Detection
The flowchart for 32B accesses and the corresponding ECC decoding steps are
summarized in Figure 5.6. The decoding process is as follows: (i) if the CRC-24 code
reports error-free, the RS decoder is not launched, (ii) if CRC code reports errors
(the first pass), an additional read is issued to retrieve the second 256b data and the
corresponding 32b ECC and the RS (72,70) decoder performs single error correction.
After correction, the two CRC-24 decoders check for errors again (the second pass).
If errors are detected, the tier-2 code is launched to correct these errors. Next we
analyze the error correction and detection capability of the 32B access scheme.
Errors Due to Small Granularity Faults: CRC-24 successfully detects er-
rors due to a single bit failure and a single column failure. A single TSV failure
results in 4-bit error, which can be detected by one CRC-24 since CRC-24 has mini-
mum distance of 6. A small granularity fault only leads to one symbol error in a RS
codeword, which can be corrected.
Errors Due to Large Granularity Faults: After the RS (72,70) decoder
performs correction, two CRC-24 codes recheck the CRC bits. If any one of the two
CRC-24 codes flags errors, the tier-2 code has to be activated to correct errors due
to large granularity faults.
Silent Data Corruption: There are two situations when the tier-1 code suffers
from silent data corruption. First, when the CRC decoder detects errors, the RS
code performs error correction and the two CRC codes miss-detect. If the RS code
performs correction, the two CRC codes recheck the decoded data again. If two CRC
codes miss-detect the errors, an SDC event occurs.
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Second, the CRC miss-detects errors at the first detection; RS(72,70) will not be
launched and the RS decoder cannot help in this case. Hence, it is very important
that tier-1 inner code to have very strong detection capabilities.
5.4 Extensions Of Config-ECC
In this section, we explain how our 32B ECC scheme can be easily extended to
support Dynamic Operation Mode (Section 5.4.1) and the Static Operation Mode
(Section 5.4.2) .
5.4.1 Dynamic Mode Protection
64B Access Size
In this case, two 32B of data and two 32b of ECC are read out from two sub-banks
and sent to the tier-1 decoder. The tier-1 decoder checks for errors using CRC-24
decoder, corrects single symbol error using RS (72,70) and launches tier-2 if errors
are detected.
The decoding steps for 64B access are as follows: (i) if only one CRC-24 code
reports errors, the RS (72,70) decoder performs single error correction, followed by
CRC-24 detection as in the 32B access scheme, (iii) if two CRC codes report errors,
RS decoder is not activated and the tier-2 decoder is launched. (iii) if two CRC-24
codes report error-free, the RS (72,70) decoder performs double error detection.
If two CRC codes report errors at the same time, it means that the errors must
not have been caused by the small granularity faults and so tier-2 code has to be
triggered. The decoding case (iii) is different from the 32B access scheme where the
RS (72,70) decoder was used for single symbol correction. Since RS (72,70) code can
perform either single error correction or double error detection, once two CRC codes
report error-free, the RS decoder activates double error detection to avoid possible
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Figure 5.7: Decoding Flowchart For 64B Access
miss-error detection by two CRC codes. The decoding flow chart is presented in
Figure 5.7. Our analysis of the error performance of the 64B access scheme is as
follows.
No Errors: When there are no errors, 2 CRC-24 codes and RS (72,70) report
error free and the memory controller sends the 512b to the lower level cache.
Errors Due to Small Granularity Faults: A single bit failure and a single
column failure lead to one bit error which can be fully detected by one CRC-24 code.
A single TSV failure results in 4 bit errors in one CRC-24 code and since CRC-24
has minimum distance of 6, the CRC-24 code can fully detect this error event. Thus,
when there is a small granularity fault, only one CRC-24 code report errors. The
small granularity fault only causes one symbol error in an RS codeword, and can be
fully corrected.
Errors Due to Large Granularity Faults: When two CRC-24 codes declare
errors, tier-2 code is launched. This is because the number of errors is beyond the
correction capability of the RS code.
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Figure 5.8: Block Diagram Of 128B Access: Static Mode
Silent Data Corruption: Silent data corruption can occur in the following
scenarios. First, two CRC-24 codes declare error free, and RS (72,70) also declares
error free. Second, one CRC-24 code declares errors, RS (72,70) performs correction
and two CRC-24 codes declare error free.
128B Access Size
Here, 128B of data is split into two 64B of data and fed to two Config-ECC 64B units
and thus the decoding flow is the same as 64B access (see Figure 5.7). Consequently,
the 64B access scheme and the 128B access scheme have identical reliability.
5.4.2 Static Mode Protection
Errors due to large granularity faults manifest as burst errors. So we propose to
add interleaving units to improve the overall error detection capability.
64B Access Size
We interleave 32B data from each sub-bank and then encode it with CRC-24 code.
Such a scheme increases the burst error detection capability without the use of a larger
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CRC code which has higher hardware complexity. The interleaved CRC decoding
procedure is based on the method in [75]. The bit sequence of two 32B data lines
are redistributed as follows. In each data line, if the bit position modulo 2 is 0, it
is sent to the first CRC-24 unit; if the bit position modulo 2 is 1, it is sent to the
second CRC-24 unit. After interleaving, the decoding steps are the same as dynamic
Config-ECC 64B scheme.
128B Access Size
128B of data are redistributed before sending to four CRC-24 units. Assume that for
the first 64B access, 32B are read from sub-banks 0 and 1 as shown in Figure 5.8. If
the bit position modulo 4 is 0, 1, 2 and 3, then that bit is send to CRC-24 unit 0, 1,
2 and 3, respectively. Now for the second 64B access, the mapping function is a little
different. For data lines 3 and 4, if the bit position modulo 4 is 1, 0, 3 and 2, these
bits are sent to CRC-24 units 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. This mapping function was
designed to avoid 8 bit errors due to a single TSV failure be sent to the same CRC
unit.
The decoding steps for static 128B access are as follows: (i) if one or two CRC-24
units report errors, the RS decoder performs single error correction, (ii) if more than
two CRC-24 decoder report errors, RS decoder is not activated and tier-2 decoder is
launched, (iii) if four CRC units report error free, the RS decoder performs double
error detection. The decoding flowchart is given in Figure 5.9.
5.5 Methodology
We introduce the experimental setup used to evaluate the reliability and compare
the energy consumption of Config-ECC in this section.
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Table 5.1: GPU And HBM System Configuration.
GPU Architecture
# of SMs, 15
Max. # of Wraps per SM 48
Max. # of Blocks per SM 8
# of Warps per SM 32
# of Schedulers per SM 2
# of Registers per SM 32768
L1 inst. cache 2kB per SM, 128B line size
4 sets, 4-ways
L2 cache 768kB, 128B line size
32 sets, 8-ways, 6 banks
Scheduler Greedy-then-oldest (GTO)
HBM Configuration
Capacity 4GB per stack
# of Channels 8
# of banks 16 per channel
I/O 144 per channel
Memory clock 0.5GHz
Row Size 1kB for 32B access
(pseudo channel mode) 2kB for 64B access
HBM Memory tRC=24, tRCD=7, tRP=7,
Timing (cycles) tCL=7, tRAS=17, tRRD=3,
tCCD=2, tWL=1, tRTP=2
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Figure 5.9: Decoding Flowchart For 128B Access: Static Mode
5.5.1 Setup For Reliability Evaluation
To measure system-level failure probability, we use Monte Carlo based simulations.
The number of trials is at least 1 billion. Since the number of simulations is very large,
we use the Mersenne Twister algorithm as the pseudo number generator to generate
error patterns that ensure randomness [80]. We inject faults into the 3D HBM DRAM
system and analyze the results after ECC decoding. Our procedure to calculate the
reliability of each ECC scheme is similar to others [27,28,31,32].
For errors due to single bit and single column failure, we assume that there is
one single bit error per access (32B, 64B or 128B). We assume that the number of
bit errors due to a single TSV failure is 4, 8 and 8 for 32B, 64B and 128B access,
respectively. Prior work [25] indicated that a row or bank failure could result in 3 to
31 random bit errors. While [28] simulated this error event, [30, 31] pessimistically
assumed that half of the bits in each data line are erroneous. Here, we combine the
assumptions of [25,28,30,31] and inject 3 to 128 random bit errors in a data line with
flipping probability of 50% to model errors due to large granularity faults.
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Table 5.2: Benchmarks For Config-ECC Energy Evaluation.
Abbr Application Dataset
RD KMN K-Means [76] 494020 objects
PAN PAG Page Rank [77] 1M data entries
PAN SPM Sparse Vector Multiplication [77] 1M points
MAR PVR Page View [78] 1M pages
RD BFS Breadth-First-Search [76] 65536 nodes
NV BIO Binomial Options [79] 512 Options
PAN FW Floyd Warshall [77] 256(V), 16K (E)
RD PF Particle Filter [76] 28x128x10 nodes
RD HOT Hotspot [76] 512x512 nodes
NV MC Monte Carol [79] 256 options
PAN CMX Graph Coloring Max [77] ecology
RD STC Streamcluster [76] 32x4096 nodes
PAN FB Floyd Warshall Block [77] 256(V), 16K (E)
PAN MIS Maximal Independent Set [77] ecology
RD BP Back Propagation [76] 65536 nodes
We examine the ECC decoding results to check whether the errors are detectable
and correctable errors (DCE), detectable but uncorrectable errors (DUE) or result
in silent data corruption (SDC) [52]. Finally, we also use the raw FIT rate provided
from [32] and give the final FIT rates of our three Config-ECC schemes in Table 5.5.
5.5.2 System Simulation Infrastructure
To evaluate the performance of our ECC schemes in terms of energy consumption,
we use GPGPU-Sim (version 3.2.2), a cycle-level performance simulator of a general
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purpose GPU architecture. The key microarchitectual parameters of the baseline
configuration are summarized in Table 5.1. The GPGPU-Sim simulator is used to
generate DRAM traces for benchmarks. To generate the DRAM traces, we assume
that the L2 cache is equipped with a perfect spatial locality predictor. For each
DRAM trace, we record the issued time of DRAM requests and number of bytes
that have been referenced during a cache line’s lifetime at the L2 cache controller.
We use the DRAM traces to compute the energy consumption of the different ECC
schemes. We select a wide range of benchmarks from Nvidia SDK [79], Mars [78],
Pannotia [77], and Rodinia [76, 81] benchmark suites to represent the diversity of
memory access patterns in GPUs. The details of benchmarks are listed in Table 5.2.
5.5.3 HBM Energy Modeling
We model HBM energy consumption using DRAMSim2 [60], a cycle-level accurate
memory system simulator. For activation/precharge energy, we use the latest value
provided by CACTI-3D and plug this value into the simulator. For 1kB page size, we
assume that the row energy is 1.5nJ and for 2kB page size, the row energy is scaled
to 3nJ. Similarly, we assume 32B read/write energy to be 4nJ based on CACTI-3D.
Since there is no publicly available data for HBM background and refresh current,
we only show the results when only activation/precharge and read/write energy are
considered.
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5.6 Results and Analysis
5.6.1 Reliability Comparison
32B Access Schemes
We compare our Config-ECC 32B scheme to the baseline CRC-16 scheme [33] and
the single bit correction and double bit detection code (SEC-DED) used by Nvidia
Tesla P100 [34]. The SDC rate of Config-ECC 32B scheme is dominated by the
detection capability of the CRC-24 code. The reason is that once CRC code miss-
detects errors, the RS decoder is not activated. Simulation result shows that CRC-24
has SDC rate of 7E − 8 (10 billion runs), which is very close to its theoretical SDC
rate 2−24 ∼= 5.9E − 8.
Both the baseline CRC-16 scheme and the SEC-DED scheme have higher SDC
rate. CRC-16 can detect all errors due to small granularity faults and has an SDC
rate of 1.5E − 5 for errors due to large granularity faults. The disadvantage of using
CRC-16 as the tier-1 code is that it can only perform detection and all correction has
to be done by the tier-2 code.
We assume SEC-DED code in [34] is based on Hamming (72,64), which protects
64 data bits with 8 parity ECC bits. The Hamming (72,64) SEC-DED can correct
all errors due to small granularity faults but it has very poor SDC rate for errors due
to large granularity faults. The error performance of the three competing schemes is
shown in Table 5.3.
Using raw FIT rate number from [32], we calculate the final FIT rates of all
schemes. CRC-16 and SEC-DED have final FIT rate of 3.7E-3 and 68.9, respectively.
In contrast, our Config-ECC 32B reduces the raw FIT rate to 1.69E-5, which is 200x
better than the baseline CRC-16.
95
Table 5.3: The Error Protection Coverage For 32B Config-ECC And The Existing
Schemes
CRC-16 SEC-DED Config-ECC 32B
(Baseline) (Nvidia) (Proposed)
Single bit DCE:0% DCE:100% DCE:100%
or column DUE:100% DUE:0% DUE:0%
failure SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Single TSV DCE:0% DCE:100% DCE:100%
failure DUE:100% DUE:0% DUE:0%
SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Single row DCE:0% DCE:0% DCE:0%
or bank DUE:(1-1.5E-5) DUE:72% DUE:(1-7E-8)
failure SDC:1.5E-5 SDC:28% SDC:7E-8
64B Access Schemes
We compare Config-ECC 64B scheme to two recent ECC schemes: Citadel [27] and
RATT-ECC [32]. For 64B access without interleaving, SDC events can occur due to
(i) two CRC-24 decoders declaring error free, and RS (72,70) decoder also declaring
error free in spite of errors, (ii) one CRC-24 decoder declaring errors, RS (72,70)
performing correction and two CRC-24 decoder declaring error free even when errors
are presented. The SDC rate of (ii) is very low because the probability of two CRC-24
codes detecting errors wrongly at the same time is extremely low (around 2−24×2−24).
We assume the worst condition when errors are all located in one 32B of data line in
case (i). In this case, the SDC rate is calculated theoretically to 2−24×2−16 ∼= 9.0E−13
(close to 10−12). We did not see any error events in 10−12 runs and so we conservatively
claim that the SDC rate is lower than 10−12. Note that the interleaving 64B access
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Table 5.4: The Error Protection Coverage For 64B Config-ECC And The Existing
Schemes
CRC-32 RS(70,64) Config-ECC 64B
[27] [32] (Proposed)
Single bit DCE:0% DCE:100% DCE:100%
or column DUE:100% DUE:0% DUE:0%
failure SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Single TSV DCE:0% DCE:100% DCE:100%
failure DUE:100% DUE:0% DUE:0%
SDC:0% SDC:0% SDC:0%
Single row DCE:0% DCE:0% DCE:0%
or bank DUE: 1 - SDC DUE: 1 - SDC DUE: 1− SDC
failure SDC:2.3E − 10 SDC: 2.4E − 10 SDC: 1E − 12
scheme used in static mode has similar SDC rate but stronger burst error detection
capability.
Citadel [27] uses CRC-32 as the tier-1 code to detect errors and relies on tier-2 code
to perform all correction. RATT-ECC [32] uses a stronger tier-1 code, RS(70,64), and
so can correct all errors due to small granularity faults. Both schemes detect errors
due to large granularity faults with very low SDC rate. The simulation results show
that our Config-ECC 64B scheme has SDC rate lower than 1E − 12, making it at
least 40x stronger than [27] and [32]. Our Config-ECC 64B reduces the raw FIT rate
to 2.44E-10, which is 20x better than [27] and [32].
128B Access Schemes
Since there is no current ECC scheme designed for 128B access, we only analyze the
reliability metrics of our Config-ECC 128B scheme. In the dynamic mode, Config-
ECC 128B is built using two Config-ECC 64B units and so the reliability performance
97
Table 5.5: The Final FIT Rate Of Config-ECC Schemes
Failure Mode Raw FIT 32B 64B/128B
Single bit 238 0 0
Single column 70 0 0
Single row 84 5.9E-6 8.4E-11
Single bank 162 1.1E-5 1.6E-10
Single TSV 41 0 0
Summary 685 1.69E-5 2.44E-10
of Config-ECC 128B is the same as Config-ECC 64B. In the static mode, Config-
ECC 128B uses an interleaver to detect up to 96 consecutive burst errors. Table 5.5
summarizes the final FIT rates of our Config-ECC.
5.6.2 Energy Comparison
Read And Write Request Handling
We compare the energy results of Config-ECC to an existing 32B ECC scheme,
namely, CRC-16 [33], an existing 64B ECC scheme, Citadel [27], and an 128B ECC
scheme that was designed exclusively for 128B data. Such a scheme would have very
high reliability for the same 12.5% parity storage. For better understanding of the
energy performance results, we summarize the different types of accesses for a 32B
ECC [33], 64B ECC [27], 128B ECC, and Config-ECC. The energy overhead is due to
the mismatch between the data access size and data size used for the different ECC
schemes. It is a function of the numbers of reads, writes, and row activations.
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32B read request: Config-ECC and [33] have no additional reads but Citadel
has an additional read of 32B of data since its ECC is based on 64B. Any 128B ECC
scheme needs to read additional 96B of data to perform ECC decoding.
32B write request: There is no overhead for [33]. However, both Config-ECC
and [27] have to read an additional 32B of data first and after encoding of ECC,
write back 64B. The 128B ECC scheme needs to read additional 96B of data and
write 128B data back.
64B read request: There is no overhead for Config-ECC, [33] and [27]. The
128B ECC scheme needs to read another 64B of data.
64B write request: There is no overhead for Config-ECC, [33] and [27] as well.
The 128B ECC scheme needs to read an additional 64B of data and write 128B data
back.
128B request: For both read and write requests, there is no overhead for any of
the ECC schemes.
Dynamic Operation Mode
We present the energy results of the four competing schemes in Figure 5.101. For
the GPGPU applications that show a mixed data fetch size preference, RD KMN,
PAN PAG, PAN SPM, MAR PVR, and RD BFS (the first five applications in Fig-
ure 5.2), Config-ECC achieves a good balance between strong reliability guarantee
and low energy consumption. Compared to the lowest energy 32B ECC design,
Config-ECC increases the active energy consumption by 1.5% while providing 200
1We observe that, of the 15 benchmarks listed in Table 5.2, PAN FW, RD HOT, NV MC,
PAN FB and RD BP have mostly 128B accesses (see Figure 5.2). Therefore, there is no differ-
ence in the energy performance of the four ECC schemes. Thus, we do not show their energy results
in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Energy Comparison Of The Competing Schemes When Operating In
The Dynamic Operation Mode
times stronger reliability guarantee. The last five benchmarks, NV BIO, RD PF,
PAN CMX, RD STC and PAN MIS have a small fraction of accesses that are 32B
and 64B, so the energy results for all schemes are very similar.
When compared to the 64B and 128B ECC designs, Config-ECC offers 20 times
stronger reliability guarantee while requiring significantly lower active energy con-
sumption by 17% and 34% less than [27] and the 128 ECC scheme. Both [27] and
128B ECC schemes have higher energy due to the mismatch between access size and
ECC data size, resulting in larger number of reads, writes, and row activations. An
analysis of the ratio of reads and writes shows that these benchmarks have high fre-
quency of 32B reads but very low frequency of 32B writes. This is why Config-ECC
has energy consumption similar to [33] even though it has higher energy consumption
for 32B writes compared to [33].
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Figure 5.11: Energy Consumption Of The Competing Schemes When Operating In
The Static Operation Mode
Static Operation Mode
For the static operation mode, we present the energy consumption of the competing
schemes for the L1 cache-off configuration, since the energy results for the L1 cache-on
configuration are expected to be the same for the competing schemes. This corre-
sponds to the first nine GPGPU applications in Figure 5.1. In this configuration, the
requests are either 32B read or write requests. Figure 5.11 shows the energy compo-
nents of Config-ECC and other ECC schemes. Config-ECC consumes an additional
10% energy compared to [33] since the number of 32B writes for these benchmarks
is high, ranging from 0% to 49%. This energy overhead comes with the benefit of a
stronger, more reliable memory system. As shown in Section 5.6.1, Config-ECC pro-
vides 200 times lower SDC rate than the 32B ECC scheme. When compared to [27]
and 128B ECC scheme, Config-ECC has 21% and 63% lower energy, respectively.
101
5.7 Summary
We present Config-ECC, a two-tiered error correction scheme that provides high
reliability with a flexible structure to support different sized accesses in HBM memory
systems. The tier-1 code is a product code that provides strong error detection
and correction capabilities to correct all errors due to small granularity faults and
detect errors with large granularity faults with very low silent data corruption (SDC)
rate. The tier-2 code is launched for correcting errors due to large granularity faults.
Config-ECC increases the reliability compared to fixed 32B and 64B ECC schemes
significantly. When the access size is 32B, the product code design allows Config-ECC
to read only 32B resulting in significant energy reduction compared to a fixed 64B
ECC scheme.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we presented several low cost ECC schemes to improve the reli-
ability of 2D and 3D DRAM systems.
6.1 2D DRAM Reliability
2D DRAMs are used in most computing systems. We considered x4, x8, x16
commodity DRAM systems and designed five erasure and error correction (E-ECC)
schemes that provide superior error protection for these systems. All our E-ECC
schemes use strong symbol based codes and provide higher error protection compared
to existing systems. Furthermore, when a chip is marked faulty, our schemes make use
of erasure correction to increase the lifetime of the memory system with no additional
cost. Synthesis results show that the decoding latency of these codes is very small and
the additional latency does not affect the timing performance of the memory system.
Also, our schemes require no extra memory accesses to perform error correction and
more importantly, do not require any change in the memory architecture.
All the proposed schemes can correct errors due to a chip failure, and when the
chip is marked faulty, they can correct one more random error. Of all these schemes,
Scheme 2 that is designed for x4 systems and uses RS(36,32) code, has the highest
reliability. Simulations on SPEC 2006 benchmarks show that Schemes 3, 4 and 5
have better timing, power and energy performance compared to x4 Chipkill-Correct
solutions. Among these schemes, Scheme 4 that is designed for x8 systems and uses
the RS(36,32) code, has the lowest power consumption and highest energy perfor-
mance while Scheme 5 that is designed for x16 systems and uses the RS(20,16) code,
103
has the best timing performance. Overall, our proposed schemes provide a low cost
solution to increasing the lifetime of commodity DRAM memory systems with lower
power and performance overhead.
6.2 3D DRAM Reliability
3D DRAM systems have lower access latency, lower power consumption and higher
bandwidth. However, designing a reliable 3D DRAM system is more challenging
because not only is 3D DRAM more error-prone, data block from a lower level is
stored in a single bank and so if this bank fails, the data is lost. We designed low
cost ECC schemes for HBM-like memory that service CPUs with fixed data access
size (64B) as well as those that service GPUs with varied data access size (32B, 64B
and 128B).
6.2.1 CPU Systems
For CPU systems, where the data access is 64B, we presented a two-tiered ECC
scheme, RATT-ECC, where the first tier is used to handle errors due to small granu-
larity faults (single bit, column and TSV) and the second-tier is used to handle errors
due to large granularity faults (row or bank failures). We chose a strong symbol based
RS code in tier-1, namely, RS (70,64) code because of its ability to correct errors due
to small granularity faults and reliably detect errors due to large granularity faults
(with SDC 2.4 ·10−10). This code can also be punctured and the resulting RS (69,64)
and RS (68,64) codes share the same encoder and decoder as the RS (70,64) code.
The punctured codes have been used to free up a ECC bank if a data bank is faulty
or help store and decode tier-1 parity symbols in a way that reduces the number of
memory accesses. The tier-2 code is an XCC based code which can also be modified
to free up a ECC bank.
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Overall RATT-ECC has excellent error handling performance with very little hard-
ware overhead. Its timing performance is also very good. Simulation results with
SPEC2006 benchmarks show that if the ECC cache is of size 2MB, the average per-
formance overhead is less than 2%. Due to the strong error correction capability and
low decoding latency of RATT-ECC, this scheme can be used to lower the refresh
frequency and the additional errors can easily be corrected. Refresh power accounts
for 33% of the total DRAM power dissipated [82] and so this scheme can be used to
to obtain lower power consumption without degrading performance of 3D DRAM.
6.2.2 GPU Systems
Future GPU systems are expected to implement a memory subsystem supporting
fine and coarse-grained data accesses to match the difference in the spatial locality of
GPGPU applications. Given the differences in the cache line sizes, an ECC scheme
that is optimized for a fixed data line size is sub-optimal.
We present Config-ECC, a two-tiered error correction scheme that provides high
reliability with a flexible structure to support different sized accesses in HBM memory
systems. The tier-1 code is a product code that provides strong error detection and
correction capabilities to correct all errors due to small granularity faults and detect
errors with large granularity faults with very low silent data corruption (SDC) rate.
The tier-2 code is launched for correcting errors due to large granularity faults. Config-
ECC increases the reliability by 200 times compared to a fixed 32B ECC scheme and
by 20 times compared to a fixed 64B ECC scheme. Also, Config-ECC can choose to
read only 32B resulting in 17% energy reduction when operating in dynamic mode
and 21% reduction when operating in static mode compared to a fixed 64B ECC
scheme.
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6.3 Future Work
Apart from HBM, there are other 3D DRAM prototypes such as HMC [8] and
Wide-I/O [44]. It is projected that HMC will replace 2D DRAM to serve as the CPU
memory and Wide-I/O will replace low power DDR as the mobile DRAM. These two
classes of memory access a data line in the same way as HBM. Thus, our proposed
ECC schemes for HBM can be used for both HMC and Wide-I/O. HMC has a new
requirement for error protection when transferring data between different die-stacked
HMCs. Such an error protection can be added on top of our proposed scheme. Wide-
I/O has larger number of I/O pins (256 bits vs. 64 bits). Our tier-1 code can be
designed to correct errors due to TSV failures more efficiently while reducing the
ECC storage overhead.
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This following presents the decoding algorithms of the proposed E-ECC codes.
(144,128) rotational code: This is a (36,32) code over GF(24) that has a mini-
mum distance of 4 and supports the following cases: (i) single error correction and
double error detection, (ii) single erasure correction, (iii) single erasure and single er-
ror correction, (iv) double erasure correction and (v) double erasure and single error
detection.
The first step is syndrome calculation, where the syndrome vector S = (s0, s1, s2, s3)
T
is calculated by multiplying the parity check matrix H with the codeword. The parity
check matrix of the rotational (144,128) code is of size 4 × 36, where each entry is
a 4 bit symbol, and is given in [12]. Case (i) is the traditional single symbol cor-
rection and double symbol detection. The decoder compares the syndrome vector
with all columns of the parity check matrix to determine the error location and the
corresponding error value. Let the jth column of the parity check matrix, H, be
hj = (hj0, hj1, hj2, hj3)
T , j = 0, 1, ..., 35. If S = ejhj holds, then the error occurred in
position j and has a value ej. If there is no j for which S = ejhj, then the decoder
declares it as a double error event.
Cases (ii) to (v) involve correction of erasure symbols. Note that since the location
of the faulty chip is known, the corresponding symbols are marked as erasure symbols.
Each erasure symbol is replaced with the zero symbol in the received codeword and
then the syndrome vector is generated. For case (ii), the syndrome vector is compared
with the column in the parity check matrix corresponding to the erasure address. If
the erasure address is i, the decoder checks if S = eihi for column i in H. If it holds,
the decoder recovers the erasure value ei in address i of codeword. Otherwise, the
single erasure and single error correction (case (iii)) unit is activated.
For case (iii), assume that the erasure address is i and the erasure value is ei;
similarly, the error address is j and error value is ej, where i 6= j. The decoder needs
to check whether the syndrome vector, S, is a linear combination of hi and hj, where
j is from 0 to 35 and i 6= j. The hardware consists of 36 sub-decoders, where the jth
decoder has hj embedded in it. The MC feeds column hi to all but the i
th sub-decoder.
If the ith and jth columns of the parity check matrix are hi = (hi0, hi1, hi2, hi3)
T and
hj = (hj0, hj1, hj2, hj3)
T , then s0 = ei · hi0 + ej · hj0, s1 = ei · hi1 + ej · hj1 equations
are used to obtain ei and ej. The decoded ei and ej values are substituted back to
calculate s˜2 = ei · hi2 + ej · hj2 and s˜3 = ei · hi3 + ej · hj3. If s˜2 = s2 and s˜3 = s3
both hold, the decoder declares that the error is located in location j of the received
codeword and corrects it.
For case (iv), the MC sends two erasure addresses (assume i and j) to the decoder
and the decoder extracts the two columns, hi and hj, corresponding to the two erasure
addresses. It uses these two columns to check whether the syndrome is a linear
combination of hi and hj. If the condition holds, the decoder recovers the two erased
symbols. Otherwise, it declares that there are two erasures and one error, which is
case (v).
RS (36,32) over GF(28): This code has minimum distance of 5 and supports
the following cases: (i) single error correction, (ii) double error correction, (iii) single
erasure correction, (iv) single erasure and single error correction, (v) double erasure
correction, (vi) double erasure and single error correction. The parity check matrix,
H, of this code is given as follows
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H =
 1 1 1 ... 1 ... 11 α α2 ... αi ... α351 α2 α4 ... α2i ... α70
1 α3 α6 ... α3i ... α105
,
where α is a primitive element of GF(28). For case (i) and case (ii), the decoder imple-
ments single error and double error correction. The decoder can classify the two cases
by using the syndrome vector [55]. Let the syndrome vector be S = (s0, s1, s2, s3)
T .
The condition s3
s2
= s2
s1
= s1
s0
corresponds to a single error event; otherwise, it is a dou-
ble error event. We implement the double error correction based on the method used
in [83,84]. To solve the error locator polynomial, we use a deterministic way to solve
the roots rather than using the Chien search method. The error locator polynomial
can be simplified to y2 + y + K [83, 84]. To solve y, a deterministic way by using
linearlized polynomials is shown in [84].
Case (iii) is trivial and easier than case (i). Suppose hi is the i
th column of H and
the erasure position is at i. The decoder compares S = ei · hi or not. If it holds, the
decoder declares it is single erasure event. If it does not hold, it activates case (iv).
Suppose the erasure address is i (known) and the error address is j (unknown). The
decoder checks whether the syndrome vector, S, is a linear combination of hi and hj.
Let S = ei · hi + ej · hj, where hi = (1, αi, α2i, α3i)T and hj = (1, αj, α2j, α3j)T , then
αj = s1·α
i+s2
s0·αi+s1 , ej =
s0·αi+s1
αi+αj
and ei = s0 + ej. The decoder first finds the error address
j, then derives ei and ej.
In Scheme 2, if two chips are marked faulty, then there are two erasures (case (v)).
Assume the positions of two erasure symbols are i and j, where i and j are from 0 to
35 and i 6= j. The relation between syndrome vector and the columns corresponding
to the erasure positions in H is as follows: s0s1s2
s3
 = ei
 1αiα2i
α3i
+ ej
 1αjα2j
α3j
,
where ei and ej are the erasure values for positions i
th and jth. The value ej is
calculated by ej =
s0αi+s1
αi+αj
and ei is obtained by ei = s0 + ej. The decoded ei
and ej values are used to calculate s˜2 and s˜3, namely, s˜2 = ei · α2i + ej · α2j and
s˜3 = ei · α3i + ej · α3j. If s˜2 = s2 and s˜3 = s3 hold, the decoder declares a double
erasure event and corrects these two erased symbols (case (v)). Otherwise, the decoder
activates the double erasure and single error correction unit corresponding to case (vi).
In case (vi), let the address of the error symbol be k, the error value be ek and
the addresses of the erasure symbols are i and j, where i 6= j, j 6= k and i 6= k.
The relation between syndrome vector and double erasure and one error is given as
follows:  s0s1s2
s3
 = ei
 1αiα2i
α3i
+ ej
 1αjα2j
α3j
+ ek
 1αkα2k
α3k

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The error address αk is derived by αk = s1α
i+j+s2αj+s2αi+s3
s0αi+j+s1αj+s1αi+s2
. The error value ek is ob-
tained by s0α
i+j+s1αj+s1αi+s2
(αk+αj)(αi+αj)
The erasure value ej is obtained by ej =
s0αj+ekα
j+ekα
k+s1
αi+αj
.
Finally, ei is obtained by ei = s0 + ej + ek.
In Schemes 3 and 4, if a single chip is marked faulty, there are two erasures but
these erasures are in consecutive locations. So if the position of the first erasure is 2i
the position of the second erasure is 2i + 1, where i = 0, 1, ..., 17. The procedure for
case (v) and case (vi) in Schemes 3 and 4 are very similar to these in Scheme 2 and
are not described here.
The RS (20,16) code over GF(28) has smaller parity check matrix but it has the
same decoding algorithm as the RS (36,32) code. Hence, we skip the description of
its decoding units of RS (20,16) here.
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In this appendix, we show how the codewords of the three RS codes, namely,
RS (70,64), RS (69,64) and RS (68,64) are related. Specifically the codeword of RS
(69,64) can be obtained by removing the last symbol of the codeword of RS (70,64).
Similarly, the codeword of RS (68,64) can be obtained by getting rid of the last two
symbols of the codeword of RS (70,64). We utilize this embedded code structure to
implement the rate-adaptive tier-1 code.
The RS(68,64) code can be obtained by shortening the RS (255,251) code [5].
After shortening, the parity check matrices of RS (69,64) and RS (70,64) can be
derived from that of RS (68,64) [85]. The parity check matrix of RS (68,64), H, is
given by
H =

1 α α2 ... α67
1 α2 α4 ... α134
1 α3 α6 ... α201
1 α4 α8 ... α13
,
and the parity check matrix, H
′
, for RS (69,64) is given by
H
′
=
(
1 · · · 1 1
H4×68 0
)
.
The parity check matrix for RS (70,64) code can be obtained from H
′
as
H
′′
=
(
H
′
5×69 0
1 α5 · · · α80 0 1
)
.
Assume the generator matrix of RS (68,64) code is G, then the generator matrices
G
′
and G
′′
of RS (69,64) and RS (70,64) can be derived from [85]. G
′
is given by
G
′
=
(
G g
′ )
,
and G
′′
is given by
G
′′
=
(
G
′
g
′′ )
,
where g
′
and g
′′
are given in [85].
For encoding, the codeword of RS (70,64) code can be expressed in the form
~c
′′
= (c0, c1, ..., c67, c68, c69), which is generated by using G
′′
. The codeword, ~c
′
, of RS
(69,64) is simply obtained by puncturing c69 in ~c
′′
. Similarly, the codeword, ~c, of RS
(68,64) is obtained by puncturing c68 and c69 in ~c
′′
. This demonstrates that all three
codes can share the same encoder.
For decoding RS (70,64), the syndrome vector ~s = (s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) is obtained
by using computing ~c
′′ · (H ′′)T . Because of the structure of H ′′ , the syndrome vector
of RS (69,64) code can be obtained by removing s5 from the syndrome vector of RS
(70,64). Similarly, the syndrome vector of RS (68,64) code which is (s1, s2, s3, s4) can
be obtained by removing s0 and s5 from ~s. Thus the syndrome caculation unit of RS
(70,64) can be used to calculate the syndrome of RS (69,64) and RS (68,64). Similarly,
the decoding units of RS (70,64) can be reused for RS (69,64). For example, for single
error correction, RS (70,64) decoder checks whether s1
s0
= s2
s1
= s3
s2
= s4
s3
= s5
s4
and the
controller unit just turns off the last condition i.e., it only checks s1
s0
= s2
s1
= s3
s2
= s4
s3
.
Note that if we do not use the embedded RS codes as given above, multiple
generator matrices or parity check matrices would have to be used to implement the
rate-adaptive RS codes, resulting in significant increase in ECC hardware overhead.
119
